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VICARIOUS CHARITY: SOCIAL
RESPONSIBILITY AND CATHOLIC SOCIAL
TEACHING
PAULA DALLEY†
INTRODUCTION
“Corporate social responsibility” is now a corporate
buzzword. While at one time there was radical disagreement
about the power of the corporation to act to benefit nonshareholder constituencies, now, as far as the public face of
corporate America goes, corporate social responsibility is
standard operating procedure. No corporation proclaims its
social irresponsibility or declares its disregard for justice or the
general well-being of the planet. Many large corporations
embrace their social obligations publicly.1 The business benefits
of corporate social responsibility are increasingly recognized by
management professionals.2 Harvard Business Review has a
regular topic on Corporate Social Responsibility.3 In short,
corporate social responsibility (“CSR”) has gone mainstream.4
†
Associate Dean for Academic Affairs and Professor of Law, Oklahoma City
University School of Law.
1
Cf. Roni Factor et al., Beliefs About Social Responsibility at Work:
Comparisons Between Managers and Non-Managers Over Time and CrossNationally, 22 BUS. ETHICS: EUR. REV. 143, 145–46 (2013) (discussing variation
between nationalities).
2
Devin Thorpe, Why CSR? The Benefits of Corporate Social Responsibility Will
Move You To Act, FORBES (May 18, 2013, 5:04 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/d
evinthorpe/2013/05/18/why-csr-the-benefits-of-corporate-social-responsibility-willmove-you-to-act. See also Daniel McGinn, Resisting the Lure of Short-termism,
HARV. BUS. REV., Nov. 2016, at 41, 43 (stating that Harvard Business Review’s “100
Best-Performing CEOs in the World” includes a measure of “ESG,” which is
environmental, social, and governance performance).
3
See Social Responsibility, HARV. BUS. REV., https://hbr.org/topic/socialresponsibility (last visited July 8, 2018).
4
Whether these public commitments to corporate social responsibility actually
produce more socially responsible behavior is a different question. The point here is
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Despite its ubiquity in corporate public relations materials,
CSR still generates legal commentary defending the power of
managers to do the right thing at the expense of corporate
profits.5 A subset of CSR commentary argues that the social
doctrine of the Catholic Church requires that corporations act to
advance social justice. Whether based on Church teaching or
not, however, the CSR literature has a fatal weakness: It ignores
human agents.
A corporation cannot act on its duties to the public because
corporations as such can do nothing: They act through human
actors. Even the board of directors has limited opportunities to
do social good, because the vast majority of business decisions
constituting corporate behavior are made by officers and other
agents,6 not by the board. The CSR literature, however, ignores
the legal powers and duties of agents and employees altogether.
Additionally, the Catholic social teaching strand of the CSR
debate ignores the centrality of the human person to Catholic
thought and fails to place moral responsibility on individuals who
are free to make moral choices. In sum, both legally and morally,
the CSR debate is focused on the wrong people.
The impact that non-director employees can have on both the
business of the corporation and the common good of society is
substantial. In corporate criminal prosecutions, it is almost
invariably those below top management, and certainly below the
level of the board, who are blamed for the bad conduct.7 Such
conduct may include making forbidden payments for business

that, if corporate leaders are willing to publicly avow corporate social
responsibility—and its benefits for business—it cannot be either unlawful or
contrary to norms of appropriate corporate behavior.
5
See infra Part I.A. While the literature does not distinguish between socially
responsible actions that are potentially profitable and those that are expected to
reduce profits, it is only the latter set of actions that is interesting.
6
Megan W. Shaner, The (Un)enforcement of Corporate Officers’ Duties, 48 U.C.
DAVIS L. REV. 271, 273 (2014).
7
See Pyott v. La. Mun. Police Emps.’ Ret. Sys., 74 A.3d 612, 614, 618 (Del. 2013)
(reversing a decision finding directors approved a marketing plan that violated the
False Claims Act); see also Jean Eaglesham & Anupreeta Das, Wall Street Crime: 7
Years, 156 Cases, and Few Convictions; Proceedings Against Individual Bank
Employees Are Rare, and Authorities Have Had Difficulty Winning Cases, WALL ST.
J. (May 27, 2016), https://www.wsj.com/articles/wall-street-crime-7-years-156-casesand-few-convictions-1464217378 (noting that the United States has brought 156
criminal and civil cases against ten of the largest banks, resulting in charges against
forty-seven people, but only one board-level executive).
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referrals—also known as taking kickbacks8—failing to comply
with
anti-money-laundering
laws,9
violating
anti-trust
provisions, mistreating investors, making false statements in
issuing securities, or “robo-signing” foreclosure petitions. In an
egregious example, Volkswagen would have us believe that the
decision to engineer around emissions regulations was taken at a
non-executive level.10
On the other hand, corporations are less quick to attribute
socially beneficial acts to low-level employees. Advertised CSR
policies are usually endorsed by the CEO, but if a mid-level
manager is responsible for the decision to make a polluting car,
she also presumably has the power to decide to make an
especially non-polluting car, or to ensure that the corporate fleet
comprises only hybrid vehicles.11 Many decisions that implicate
serious social policies are made at an even lower level:
purchasing (including selecting suppliers), advertising and
marketing (including sponsorships and endorsements), setting
wages and prices, and adopting and implementing routine
employment policies. The opportunities for mid-level managers
to engage in CSR are legion. Unfortunately for CSR advocates,
however, agency law, not corporate law, governs officers and
other corporate employees,12 and corporate agents, as opposed to
directors, are prohibited by current law from engaging in CSR
unless they are authorized to do so, directly or indirectly, by the
board: The agent’s duty of loyalty prohibits the agent from
engaging in any behavior that the agent believes will not advance
the business of the principal—for example, profit-sacrificing
CSR.13

8

See In re Caremark Int’l Inc. Derivative Litig., 698 A.2d 959, 963–64, 971 (Del.
Ch. 1996).
9
See Stone v. Ritter, 911 A.2d 362, 365 (Del. 2006).
10
Jack Ewing, Engineering a Deception: What Led to Volkswagen’s Diesel
Scandal, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 16, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2017/bu
siness/volkswagen-diesel-emissions-timeline.html.
11
Miriam A. Cherry & Judd F. Sneirson, Beyond Profit: Rethinking Corporate
Social Responsibility and Greenwashing After the BP Oil Disaster, 85 TUL. L. REV.,
983, 1000 (2011). See also Paul Weitzel & Zachariah J. Rodgers, Board Shareholder
Value and the Inevitable Role of Conscience, 12 N.Y.U. J.L. & BUS. 35, 88–90 (2015).
12
See Beard Research, Inc. v. Kates, 8 A.3d 573, 601 (Del. Ch. 2010), aff’d sub
nom ASDI Inc. v. Beard Research Inc., 11 A.3d 749 (Del. 2010).
13
Guy Mundlak & Issi Rosen-Zvi, Signaling Virtue? A Comparison of Corporate
Codes in the Fields of Labor and Environment, 12 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 603,
604–05 (2011).
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If corporations cannot engage in CSR because they do not
really exist—and have no moral responsibility—and corporate
agents are prohibited from engaging in CSR by agency law, who
can act to improve corporate behavior? The Church’s social
doctrine provides an often-overlooked answer to this question:
Individuals who are acting as principals, not agents, are
responsible for ensuring that their actions are socially
responsible. Individuals act as principals when they make
decisions about their own property, and it is those decisions that
should be the subject of commentary and debate.
This Article begins with a brief introduction to the CSR
debate. Part II describes the legal role of various human actors
in the corporation, and Part III describes the legal restrictions on
those actors’ socially responsible, but unauthorized, decisions.
Part IV describes in some detail the relevant social teaching of
the Catholic Church and explains that it does not apply to
corporations or other corporate actors. Part V then describes the
appropriate application of Catholic social doctrine to economic
actors.
I.
A.

CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY

In General

As noted above, while corporate CSR statements and policies
are now standard operating procedures, the obligations of
individual managers to make specific choices that prefer, in some
way, the interests of others to the financial interests of
stockholders are still hotly debated.14 While some commentators
14

Recent articles on the subject include: Anastasia Telesetsky, Beyond
Voluntary Corporate Social Responsibility: Corporate Human Rights Obligations To
Prevent Disasters and To Provide Temporary Emergency Relief, 48 VAND. J.
TRANSNAT’L L. 1003, 1016 (2015) (corporations have duties to support positive
human rights); Delwin Lau, Note, Fixing International Labor Law: Corporate Social
Responsibility, a Means or an End?, 24 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 725, 728–32 (2015)
(summarizing debate); Margaret Ryznar & Karen E. Woody, A Framework on
Mandating Versus Incentivizing Corporate Social Responsibility, 98 MARQ. L. REV.
1667, 1669 (2015); Stephen M. Bainbridge, Corporate Social Responsibility in the
Night-Watchman State, 115 COLUM. L. REV. SIDEBAR 39 (2015) [hereinafter
Bainbridge, Corporate Social Responsibility] (discussing shareholder primacy);
Stefan J. Padfield, Corporate Social Responsibility & Concession Theory, 6 WM. &
MARY BUS. L. REV. 1 (2015) (summarizing competing theories); Daniel J. Morrissey,
The Riddle of Shareholder Rights and Corporate Social Responsibility, 80 BROOK. L.
REV. 353 (2015) (arguing that CSR is good business but that a federal law should
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argue that managers may—or must—consider the public good,
others argue that managers are obligated to pursue only
profitability. This so-called “shareholder wealth maximization
norm” claims that managers—including boards of directors—are
hired solely to produce profits for shareholders.15
There is a legal aspect to this debate: Are managers
permitted by law to consider non-shareholder interests? There is
also a normative and practical aspect: What should a manager
actually do, assuming that she is permitted to consider societal
interests to at least some degree? The issue is rarely litigated,
but most commentators believe that a board’s decisions relating
to social responsibility will almost always be protected by the
business judgment rule, which forbids judicial scrutiny.16
However, unless the owners of the corporation agree otherwise,
the managers of a for-profit corporation are obligated to operate a
business and not a charity.17 This still leaves plenty of room for
corporate philanthropy, whether through support of expressly
charitable causes or through business decisions that are likely to
confer significant benefits on outsiders without earning profits
for the shareholders.18 Despite legal latitude to engage in
also mandate CSR). See also Jonathan R. Macey, Corporate Social Responsibility: A
Law & Economics Perspective, 17 CHAP. L. REV. 331 (2014); Joseph J. Norton,
Reflections on “In the Best Interest of the Corporation” and “Corporate Social
Responsibility”: An Essay Honouring the Memory of Professor Alan R. Bromberg, 68
SMU L. REV. 603 (2015) (summarizing current status of CSR movement); J. Haskell
Murray, Choose Your Own Master: Social Enterprise, Certifications, and Benefit
Corporation Statutes, 2 A M. U. B US . L. R EV. 1, 5–17 (2012) (describing debate and
relevant law).
15
For a summary of the relevant positions, see Etsy’s I.P.O. and Public
Corporations’ Obligations to Shareholders, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 16, 2015),
https://www.nytimes.com/roomfordebate/2015/04/16/what-are-corporations-obligat
ions-to-shareholders. Interestingly, a search for recent law review articles on
“shareholder wealth maximization” produced many articles criticizing the doctrine
as the prevailing view, but none espousing it.
16
See Murray, supra note 14, at 12. A decision is protected by the business
judgment rule unless it is uninformed, not in good faith, or involves a conflict of
interest. See eBay Domestic Holdings, Inc. v. Newmark, 16 A.3d 1, 36, 40–41, n.91
(Del. Ch. 2010). A decision that is uninformed, in bad faith, or made to advance the
private interests of the decision maker would not, by any reasonable sense of the
term, be a socially responsible one.
17
See Newmark, 16 A.3d at 34; Dodge v. Ford Motor Co., 170 N.W. 668, 684
(Mich. 1919).
18
Proctor & Gamble’s PuR water project is a useful illustration. Initially, P&G
intended to sell its water purification system in developing countries. It spent $20
million on research and development to make the product available to the very poor
at an affordable price. Despite PuR’s superiority, consumers preferred cheaper
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socially beneficial acts, there are still plenty of corporations that
are operated in socially irresponsible ways that could benefit
from stronger public or investor pressure to clean up their acts.19
Public relations notwithstanding, the shareholder wealth
maximization norm may still influence individual corporate
leaders,20 and continues to be taught in elite business schools and
law schools.21
B.

Corporate Social Responsibility and the Social Doctrine of the
Catholic Church

Some commentators have supported calls for CSR with
precepts from Catholic social doctrine.22 That doctrine can be
used to evaluate—and criticize—business practices,23 but many
alternatives, and the project was unprofitable. P&G nevertheless decided to continue
the project on a charitable basis—in other words, at a loss to its shareholders. See
Denis G. Arnold & Andres Valentin, Corporate Social Responsibility at the Base of
the Pyramid, 66 J. BUS. RES. 1904, 1908 (2013).
19
Recent examples include Volkswagen concealing violation of emission
controls, Nathan Bomey, EPA Accuses Volkswagen, Audi of Evading Emission Laws,
USA TODAY (Sept. 18, 2015, 7:38 PM), https://www.usatoday.com/story/money/cars
/2015/09/18/epa-accuses-volkswagen-audi-evading-emission-laws/72400018; HSBC
laundering money for drug cartels and members of al-Qaeda, Alastair Jamieson,
HSBC Allowed Money Laundering That Likely Funded Terror, Drugs, NBC NEWS
(July 17, 2012, 5:52 AM), https://www.nbcnews.com/business/report-hsbc-allowedmoney-laundering-likely-funded-terror-drugs-889170;
GlaxoSmithKline
bribing
doctors, Matt Robinson, Glaxo to Pay $20 Million SEC Fine over Bribery in China,
BLOOMBERG (Sept. 30, 2016, 3:35 PM), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/201
6-09-30/glaxo-to-pay-20-million-sec-fine-over-bribing-chinese-officials; and Citigroup,
JPMorgan Chase, Barclays, and Royal Bank of Scotland manipulating currency
markets, Kevin McCoy & Kevin Johnson, 5 Banks Guilty of Rate-rigging, Pay More
than $5B, USA TODAY (May 20, 2015, 7:35 PM), https://www.usatoday.com/st
ory/money/2015/05/20/billions-in-bank-fx-settlements/27638443.
20
See Joseph L. Bower & Lynn S. Paine, The Error at the Heart of Corporate
Leadership, 95 HARV. BUS. REV., May–June 2017, 50, 51; Murray, supra note 14, at
17–19.
21
See Lyman Johnson, Law and Legal Theory in the History of Corporate
Responsibility: Corporate Personhood, 35 SEATTLE U. L. R EV. 1135, 1163 n.136
(2012).
22
See HUMANISM IN ECONOMICS AND BUSINESS: PERSPECTIVES OF THE
CATHOLIC SOCIAL TRADITION (Domènec Melé & Martin Schlag eds., 2015); Michael
Miller, Corporate Social Responsibility and the Role of Business in Society, in
CATHOLIC SOCIAL TEACHING AND THE MARKET ECONOMY 333, 336 (St. Pauls Pub. 2d
ed. 2014). For a summary of early debates, see Thomas J. Molony, Charity, Truth,
and Corporate Governance, 56 L OY. L. R EV. 825, 845–64 (2010).
23
See generally Gerald F. Cavanagh, S.J. et al., Using Principles of Catholic
Social Thought To Evaluate Business Activities, 10 J. CATH. SOC. THOUGHT 155
(2013); Oliver F. Williams, C.S.C., Is It Possible To Have a Business Based on
Solidarity and Mutual Trust? The Challenge of Catholic Social Teaching to
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commentators have taken the position that it “requires” that
corporations operate so as to advance authentic human
development. These commentators focus on the corporation as
the object of the Church’s teaching. In their view, that teaching
requires a recognition that the corporation exists for the
advancement of the common good.24 For example, they argue
that “Catholic Social Thought requires, at a minimum, that
corporate law allow managers to act in a moral manner.”25 There
should be a Catholic vision of the corporation that “emphasizes
the corporation’s social responsibilities”;26 “a corporation cannot
be content with seeking only the intermediate goods of, for
example, efficiency or wealth creation alone.”27 The law should
ensure “corporate awareness of . . . its social responsibilities”;28
“the corporation . . . must be dedicated to the flourishing of its
employees as human beings.”29 This strand of commentary also
generally ignores the distinction discussed below between
directors, on the one hand, and officers and other employees, on
the other, by referring vaguely to “managers.”30

Capitalism and the Promise of Southwest Airlines, 9 J. C ATH. SOC . T HOUGHT 59
(2012).
24
See generally Ronald J. Colombo, Religious Conceptions of Corporate Purpose,
74 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 813 (2017); Ronald J. Colombo, Toward a Nexus of Virtue,
69 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 3, 71 (2012) [hereinafter Colombo, Toward a Nexus of
Virtue]; Leo L. Clarke & Edward C. Lyons, The Corporate Common Good: The Right
and Obligation of Managers To Do Good to Others, 32 U. DAYTON L. R EV. 275, 282–
84 (2007); Gerald J. Russello, Catholic Social Thought and the Large Multinational
Corporation, 46 J. C ATH. L EGAL STUD . 107, 114 (2007); MARC GUNTHER, FAITH AND
FORTUNE: THE QUIET REVOLUTION TO REFORM AMERICAN BUSINESS 11 (2004).
25
Molony, supra note 22, at 853.
26
Susan J. Stabile, A Catholic Vision of the Corporation, 4 SEATTLE J. S OC.
JUST. 181, 183 (2005) (emphasis added). Professor Stabile suggests that Catholic
business people should be “encouraged to bring their faith into their business
dealings,” id. at 201, apparently as a way to make corporations more socially
responsible.
27
Russello, supra note 24, at 125 (emphasis added).
28
Mark A. Sargent, Competing Visions of the Corporation in Catholic Social
Thought, 1 J. C ATH. SOC. T HOUGHT 561, 568 (2004) (emphasis added).
29
Id. at 565 n.9.
30
See, e.g., Molony, supra note 22, at 867 (“[m]anagement must direct the
corporation”); Clarke & Lyons, supra note 24, at 275 (“Manager’s Dilemmas”);
Sargent, supra note 28, at 572 (“managers’ responsibility”); Joseph S. Spoerl, The
Social Responsibility of Business, 42 A M. J. JURIS . 277, 277 (1997) (“[M]anagers are
agents of shareholders, that is, they are hired by shareholders . . . .”). Other
commentators gloss over this issue through the use of the passive voice. See Sargent,
supra note 28, at 570 (“corporations should be managed”).
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More recently, commentators have brought Catholic social
teaching to bear on specific business practices or specific industry
segments.31 Meanwhile, another strand of commentary applies
the Church’s social doctrine to justify both the existence of
corporations and their pursuit of profits for shareholders.32 They
argue that corporations, as communities organized for a common
purpose, can advance the goals of Catholic social teaching by
fostering—or at least providing a forum for—“fraternity,
sympathy, fellowship, and cooperation,”33 and by putting into
effect the principle of subsidiarity.34 They also oppose, in
general, the view that Church teaching requires managers to
reject the shareholder wealth maximization norm.35
In sum, the application of Catholic social doctrine to CSR has
assumed that the doctrine applies to the corporation as such.
But the corporation is incapable of doing anything, good or bad;
only humans can act in the world. The Church’s teaching is
directed at humans, and corporations are not subject to the
Church’s Magisterium. Moreover, social justice can only be
accomplished by the acts of humans, because the Church’s
definition of social justice requires that acts of justice be carried
out with a state of mind that is not only unavailable to a nonhuman in a direct sense, but also not vicariously available.36 As
explained more fully below, the Church directs that Catholics live
31
See, e.g., Cathy A. Driscoll et al., Nature Is Prior to Us: Applying Catholic
Social Thought and Anabaptist-Mennonite Theology to the Ethics of Stakeholder
Prioritization for the Natural Environment, 3 J. RELIGION & BUS. ETHICS 1 (2012);
Ronald Paul Hill & Michael L. Capella, Impoverished Consumers, Catholic Social
Teaching, and Distributive Justice, 67 J. BUS. RES. 32 (2014); Michael J. White,
Homo Laborans: Work in Modern Catholic Social Thought, 58 VILL. L. REV. 455
(2013); Ericka Costa & Tommaso Ramus, The Italian Economia Aziendale and
Catholic Social Teaching: How To Apply the Common Good Principle at the
Managerial Level, 106 J. BUS. ETHICS 103 (2012); Mara Del Baldo, Corporate Social
Responsibility and Corporate Governance in Italian SMEs: The Experience of Some
“Spirited Businesses,” 16 J. MGMT. & GOVERNANCE 1 (2012).
32
There are also those who argue that an application of Catholic social teaching
to require corporate directors to consider non-shareholder interests violates the
shareholder wealth maximization norm and current corporate law and theory. See
Stephen M. Bainbridge, The Bishops and the Corporate Stakeholder Debate, 4 VILL.
J. L. & I NV . MGMT. 3, 10 (2002) [hereinafter Bainbridge, The Bishops].
33
MICHAEL N OVAK , T OWARD A T HEOLOGY OF THE C ORPORATION 16 (rev. ed.
1990).
34
See Bainbridge, The Bishops, supra note 32, at 25–26.
35
See Bainbridge, Corporate Social Responsibility, supra note 14, at 41, 53–54;
see also Sargent, supra note 28, at 582–83.
36
See CATECHISM OF THE CATHOLIC CHURCH ¶¶ 1929–31 (2d ed. 1997).
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with caritas, not merely give to “charity.”37 A corporation cannot
feel, or act with, caritas, and an agent cannot carry out caritas
with someone else’s assets. The link between Catholic social
teaching and corporate social responsibility is a red herring.
II. CORPORATE ACTORS
A corporation is, of course, incapable of thinking, doing, or
saying anything. It acts solely through humans with distinct
legal roles. The directors set general broad-scale policy and
monitor the managers, and the managers and other employees
carry out corporate business.38 The shareholders—who may be
humans only indirectly—are usually limited to choosing directors
However,
and rubber-stamping directorial decisions.39
shareholders have a significant private role when they choose to
invest in a business venture at all.
A.

Directors

By law, the voice of the corporation is the board of directors,
which decides all corporate questions and is subject only to the
state incorporation statute, the foundational documents of the
corporation, shareholder voting rights, and its fiduciary duties.40
It is the board’s role, for example, to decide that the corporation
will add a significant new line of business.41 Because the board is
not controlled by the corporation, it is not an agent of the
corporation; rather, its powers are conferred by the corporate
statute.42 Nevertheless, the board owes fiduciary duties to “the
corporation and its shareholders.”43 The board acts solely as a
body, and each individual director has no legal power to act on
behalf of the corporation.44

37

See infra Part IV.
R OBERT C HARLES C LARK, CORPORATE L AW § 3.2.1, at 105–06 (1986).
39
Id. § 3.1.1, at 93–94.
40
See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 1.03 cmt. c (AM. LAW INST. 2006).
41
See generally CLARK, supra note 38, § 3.2.1, at 105–06.
42
See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 1.01 cmt. f(2) (AM. LAW INST. 2006);
People ex rel. Manice v. Powell, 201 N.Y. 194, 200, 94 N.E. 634, 637 (N.Y. 1911).
43
See In re Rural Metro Corp. Stockholders Litig., 88 A.3d 54, 80 (Del. Ch.
2014).
44
See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 1.01 cmt. f(2) (AM. LAW INST. 2006).
38
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Under corporate law, the board has broad power not only to
adopt business policies but also to state corporate objectives.45 A
corporation’s certificate of incorporation may, but rarely does,
contain a statement about the corporation’s specific business
purpose.46
In the absence of such a provision, corporate
objectives are determined by the board.47 If the board chooses to
alter course, it has the power to do so without shareholder
consent, unless the change requires a structural change such as a
merger or an amendment to the certificate of incorporation.48
The board of a for-profit corporation cannot adopt a charitable
purpose, because that would conflict with its charter.49 But
choosing among potentially profit-making ventures50 and
choosing social and other policies that govern the operation of
those ventures is within the board’s power.
While the board’s powers are extremely broad, the board’s
actions are theoretically constrained by the board’s duties to the
corporation and its shareholders. The relevant legal question for
CSR is the power of the board of directors, speaking on behalf of
the corporation, to undertake or direct actions or policies that
benefit others more than, or even at the expense of, the
corporation and its shareholders. Corporate law imposes duties
of care and loyalty on the board of directors.51 However, the
business judgment rule provides that a board’s decisions will not
be scrutinized as long as the directors “acted on an informed
basis, in good faith and in the honest belief that the action taken

45
See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8 § 141(a) (West 2016); MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT
§ 8.01(b) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2002).
46
See MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 2.02(b)(2)(i) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2002).
47
See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8 § 141(a) (West 2016); MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT
§ 8.01(b) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2002).
48
For example, in a celebrated 1989 case, Time Incorporated acquired Warner
Communications, Inc., a company arguably larger than Time, and launched itself
into the entertainment and cable business without a shareholder vote. See generally
Paramount Commc’ns Inc. v. Time Inc., 571 A.2d 1140 (Del. 1989).
49
See eBay Domestic Holdings, Inc. v. Newmark, 16 A.3d 1, 34 (Del. Ch. 2010).
50
See Gimbel v. Signal Cos., 316 A.2d 599, 605 (Del. Ch. 1974), aff’d, 316 A.2d
619 (Del. 1974).
51
In Delaware, a failure to act in good faith constitutes a breach of the duty of
loyalty. See Stone v. Ritter, 911 A.2d 362, 369–70 (Del. 2006). The Model Business
Corporation Act (“MBCA”) does not set forth a specific duty of loyalty, but requires
that a director act “(i) in good faith, and (ii) in a manner the director reasonably
believes to be in the best interests of the corporation.” MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT
§ 8.30(a) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2016).
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was in the best interests of the company.”52 Thus, a board may
act to implement socially beneficial policies as long as the board
believes, in good faith, that those policies will benefit the
company.
The law does not require that the benefits from a particular
policy materialize in a certain a time frame,53 and it does not
require that the board perform an extensive cost-benefit analysis
for every decision.54 A board may, for example, cause the
corporation to make charitable contributions because they will
bring good will and favorable publicity to the company,55 as long
as the contribution is reasonable in relation to the company’s
size, and the board can articulate a benefit to the company.56 A

52
Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812 (Del. 1984). The MBCA provides that a
director will not be liable for any decision unless the decision:
[C]onsisted or was the result of: (i) action not in good faith; or (ii) a decision
(A) which the director did not reasonably believe to be in the best interests
of the corporation, or (B) as to which the director was not informed to an
extent the director reasonably believed appropriate in the circumstances; or
(iii) a lack of objectivity due to [a conflict of interest].
MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 8.31(a)(2)(i)–(iii) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2016).
53
See Paramount, 571 A.2d at 1154 (“The fiduciary duty to manage a corporate
enterprise includes the selection of a time frame for achievement of corporate
goals.”).
54
“The members of the board of directors or a board committee, when becoming
informed in connection with their decision-making function or devoting attention to
their oversight function, shall discharge their duties with the care that a person in a
like position would reasonably believe appropriate under similar circumstances.”
MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 8.30(b) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2016). “There is no one way for
‘becoming informed’ [in connection with the board’s decision-making function], and
both the method and measure—‘how to’ and ‘how much’—are matters of reasonable
judgment for the director to exercise.” Id. § 8.30 cmt. 2.
55
See Kahn v. Sullivan, 594 A.2d 48, 61 (Del. 1991) (opining that the business
judgment rule would protect decision by the board of Occidental Petroleum to spend
$85.6 million to build and maintain a museum to house the art collection of its
founder, Armand Hammer); Ella M. Kelly & Wyndham Inc. v. Bell, 266 A.2d 878,
878–79 (Del. 1970) (applying the business judgment rule to board’s decision to pay a
tax “voluntarily”); Theodora Holding Co. v. Henderson, 257 A.2d 398, 404–05 (Del.
Ch. 1969); A.P. Smith Mfg. Co. v. Barlow, 98 A.2d 581, 590 (N.J. 1953).
56
Charitable contributions are often used to protect or restore good will. In
2013, the ten largest corporate donors, by dollars given, were as follows: Walmart,
Wells Fargo, Chevron, Goldman Sachs, ExxonMobil, JP Morgan Chase, Bank of
America, Johnson & Johnson, General Electric, and Target. Sarah Frostenson &
Megan O’Neil, 10 Companies That Gave the Most Cash in 2013, CHRONICLE OF
PHILANTHROPY (July 13, 2014), http://philanthropy.com/article/10-Companies-ThatGave-the/147651; see also Susanne Craig, Goldman Sachs, Buying Redemption, N.Y.
TIMES: DEALBOOK (Oct. 26, 2013, 2:21 PM), https://dealbook.nytimes.com/
2013/10/26/goldman-sachs-buying-redemption (discussing Goldman Sachs’ large
charitable gifts following the financial crisis).
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board may also adopt a policy that benefits the community at the
apparent expense of the corporation, as long as the board can
point to potential benefits to the corporation.57 If the board were
unable or unwilling to identify a benefit to the corporation, it
would arguably not be acting in the good faith belief that the
decision was in the best interests of the corporation, and the
decision would, theoretically, be a breach of the duty of loyalty
and not protected by the business judgment rule.58 In that case,
the members of the board might be liable for losses suffered by
the corporation as a result of the board’s action.59
The “best interests of the corporation” standard imposes only
a very limited constraint on the board. The board decides what
the “best interests of the corporation” are because those interests
depend on corporate objectives.60 Because the board defines the
corporation’s business, it can ensure that otherwise unprofitable
measures benefit the “business.”61 When the CVS/Caremark
board62 decided that the corporation’s stores would forgo $2
billion in profit from tobacco sales, it renamed its pharmacy

57
Some commentary implies that this is not legally accurate. See, e.g.,
Bainbridge, Corporate Social Responsibility, supra note 14, at 42, 53. My argument
is that, in pursuit of the best interests of the corporation, directors have broad
discretion to take actions that in fact benefit outsiders.
58
The case law on this subject is so rare that the legal analysis is largely
theoretical. However, one can explain the remarkable case of Dodge v. Ford, 170
N.W. 668 (Mich. 1919), on this basis, because Henry Ford was unwilling to articulate
the many ways in which his “semi-eleemosynary” operations were benefiting the
company. See Leo E. Strine, Jr., Our Continuing Struggle with the Idea That ForProfit Corporations Seek Profit, 47 WAKE F OREST L. R EV. 135, 147–48 (2012); cf.
Joseph K. Leahy, A Decade After Disney: A Primer on Good and Bad Faith, 83 U.
CIN. L. REV. 859, 882–83 (2015) (discussing personal, non-financial motive as bad
faith).
59
Because liability in such a case would be premised on a breach of the duty of
loyalty, an exculpatory clause such as that permitted by § 102(b)(7) of Delaware
General Corporation Law would not protect the directors. In addition, because the
claim would be based on a breach of the duty of loyalty, the burden would
presumably be on the directors to show that their decision was entirely fair to the
corporation. Such cases are sufficiently rare that the applicable legal standards are
uncertain.
60
See Paula J. Dalley, To Whom It May Concern: Fiduciary Duties and Business
Associations, 26 DEL. J. CORP. L. 515, 546–49 (2001); see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD)
OF AGENCY § 1.01 cmt. f(2) (AM. LAW INST. 2006) (power of board).
61
If such decisions are disclosed, shareholders who are unconvinced about the
benefits of those policies can make their own decisions about the company’s likely
long-term profitability. See GUNTHER, supra note 24, at 177.
62
There are no sources that attribute this decision to the board, but such a step
must have been approved, if not initiated, by the board.
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division “CVS Health”—a step that emphasized the fact that
forgoing tobacco profits was advancing the corporation’s
business.63 Thus, while a board’s open avowal of permanently
profit-sacrificing policies would potentially generate liability for
the board, a board can, as a practical matter, direct many
unprofitable CSR activities as long as it frames its decisions
carefully.
B.

Shareholders

Shareholders often represent an additional human
participant in the corporation.64 Shareholders, as such, are not
agents of the corporation and have no role in the operation of the
business. Even a controlling or sole shareholder operates an
incorporated business, not as a shareholder, but in her capacity
as president or CEO, if she is wise.65 The legal function of the
shareholders is to elect directors and to approve or veto
fundamental changes in the corporation that are initiated by the
board.66 While the shareholders are beneficiaries of the duties
owed by the board67 and other corporate agents, they are not

63
See Tom Murphy, CVS Changes Name, Stops Tobacco Sales Early, WASH.
EXAMINER (Sept. 3, 2014, 2:21 PM), http://www.washingtonexaminer.com/cvschanges-name-stops-tobacco-sales-early/article/2161585; see also Timothy W. Martin
& Mike Esterl, CVS To Stop Selling Cigarettes: Pharmacy Chain Says Tobacco
Products Don’t Fit with Push as Health-Care Provider, WALL ST. J. (Feb. 5, 2014,
7:45 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/cvs-to-stop-selling-cigarettes-1391602647.
64
Although most shareholders nowadays are institutions, those institutions
almost always represent humans, either directly or indirectly. See Ronald J.
Colombo, Ownership, Limited: Reconciling Traditional and Progressive Corporate
Law via an Aristotelian Understanding of Ownership, 34 J. CORP. L. 247, 266 n.145
(2008) [hereinafter Colombo, Ownership, Limited]. Institutions themselves act
through human agents, who are generally governed by agency law in the same way
as corporate agents, although institutional investors may be organized as trusts,
partnerships, limited partnerships or other unincorporated entities, and the law
governing their managers may be slightly different from corporate and general
agency law.
65
A shareholder may become liable for the obligations of the corporation if she
disregards the corporate form by commingling funds, ignoring corporate formalities,
and otherwise acting as if she were a sole proprietor. See WILLIAM MEADE
F LETCHER, 1 FLETCHER CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF CORPORATIONS § 41.10 (2016)
[hereinafter F LETCHER C YCLOPEDIA].
66
See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 1.01 cmt. f(2) (AM. LAW INST. 2006).
67
See N. Am. Catholic Educ. Programming Found., Inc. v. Gheewalla, 930 A.2d
92, 101 (Del. 2007).
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their principals.68 When they sue to enforce those duties they
must do so derivatively, on behalf of the corporation—the true
principal.69
The shareholders do have a role in the broader structure of
the corporation, however.
For one thing, they—or their
predecessors—provided the capital needed to establish and run
the corporation. Although in many jurisdictions even a majority
of the shareholders cannot force the corporation to dissolve,70
they can withdraw their financial support by seeking to sell their
shares and thereby force down the market price of the corporate
stock. Eventually, the company’s liquidation value would exceed
its market value and someone would come along and liquidate
it.71 The shareholders elect directors, and even in a publicly
traded corporation that occasionally makes a difference.72 In
public corporations, shareholders vote on shareholder proposals
and on executive compensation, and in all corporations
shareholders vote on major transactions.73
Such votes
74
occasionally have practical significance.
Boards of public
corporations also consult large shareholders informally.75 Thus,
while shareholders—other than controlling shareholders—do not
affect management of the corporation, they have a number of
decisions to make on their own behalf as owners of shares.76

68
Commentators often speak of the shareholders as the “principal” of the
corporate board and corporate managers, see, e.g., Colombo, Ownership, Limited,
supra note 64, at 265–66, but this is not legally accurate. See generally Paula J.
Dalley, Shareholder (and Director) Fiduciary Duties and Shareholder Activism,
8 HOUS . B US . & T AX L.J. 301, 310–14 (2008).
69
See F LETCHER C YCLOPEDIA, supra note 65, § 5729.
70
See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8 § 275 (West 2010) (requiring unanimous
shareholder vote); MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 14.02 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2002) (requiring
board action).
71
See WILLIAM A. KLEIN ET AL., B USINESS ORGANIZATION AND F INANCE :
L EGAL AND E CONOMIC P RINCIPLES 202 (11th ed. 2010).
72
See id. at 189.
73
See id. at 124–25.
74
See Michael Klausner, Fact and Fiction in Corporate Law and Governance, 65
STAN . L. R EV. 1325, 1361 (2013).
75
See id. at 1360–62.
76
The “nexus-of-contracts” theory holds that the shareholders do not own the
corporation, see FRANK H. EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC
STRUCTURE OF CORPORATE LAW 12 (1991), but there is no question that the
shareholders own shares, which constitute property in every legal sense. See
FLETCHER CYCLOPEDIA, supra note 65, § 5096; Stephen M. Bainbridge, In Defense of
the Shareholder Wealth Maximization Norm: A Reply to Professor Green, 50 WASH.
& L EE L. R EV. 1423, 1433 (1993) [hereinafter Bainbridge, In Defense].
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Officers and Other Employees

While the board has broad powers to determine business
policy and practices, it cannot as a practical matter implement its
decisions. Rather, it acts by instructing, directing, empowering,
and overseeing corporate agents. Corporate officers, unlike
directors, are agents of the corporation77 and are fully subject to
the law of agency, as described below.78 Even employees who
lack any authority to act on behalf of the corporation are agents
for some purposes and owe a fiduciary duty of loyalty.79 While no
one expects the board to run the company on a daily basis, the
law does contemplate that the officers and other employees will
be able to trace their authority directly or indirectly to a decision
of the board.80 Thus, a middle manager who approves hiring
additional personnel at a particular facility has the power to
make that decision because the board authorized someone,
probably the president, to take whatever actions were necessary
to conduct business, and the president then assigned parts of
that job to an underling, and so forth. Corporate officers and
other employees do not have the legal power to decide what
corporate policy will be, unless the board has delegated that
authority to the employee in question.81 While the board can, in

77

See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY, § 1.01 cmt. c. (AM. LAW INST. 2006).
See Beard Research, Inc. v. Kates, 8 A.3d 573, 601 (Del. Ch. 2010), aff’d sub
nom ASDI Inc. v. Beard Research Inc., 11 A.3d 749 (Del. 2010).
79
See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 1.01 cmt. c. (AM. LAW INST. 2006).
Compare id. § 8.01, cmt. c. (discussing whether all employees owe duties), with
Charles A. Sullivan, Mastering the Faithless Servant?: Reconciling Employment
Law, Contract Law, and Fiduciary Duty, 4 WIS . L. R EV. 777, 810–11 n.193 (2011)
(listing cases rejecting idea that employee is a true agent owing a duty of loyalty).
See generally Deborah A. DeMott, Relationships of Trust and Confidence in the
Workplace, 100 CORNELL L. REV. 1255 (2015) [hereinafter DeMott, Relationships of
Trust].
80
The powers of some officers are set out in state incorporation statutes and in
the corporation’s charter and bylaws. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY
§ 1.03 cmt. c (AM. LAW INST. 2006).
81
Cf. Einer Elhauge, Sacrificing Corporate Profits in the Public Interest, 80
N.Y.U. L. REV. 733, 815–16 (2005) (noting that, where there is a controlling
shareholder, she is the “manager,” and “[l]ower level managers should not enjoy
discretion to sacrifice the corporation’s profits absent some indication of approval by
the controlling shareholder of the corporate policy”).
78
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effect, define its own fiduciary duties because it defines the
corporate business, corporate agents may not—they are bound by
the board’s decision about the best interests of the corporation.82
III. LEGAL RESTRICTIONS ON CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY
Since the primary actors in corporate enterprises are officers
and other employees, it is the law of agency that is most relevant
to the socially responsible or irresponsible behavior of
“corporations.” The Third Restatement of Agency divides an
agent’s duties to the principal into duties of loyalty and duties of
performance.83 Duties of performance include, in addition to the
well-known duty of care, various duties requiring obedience to
the principal and compliance with any contract between the
principal and the agent.84 The duty of care requires that an
agent act with reasonable “care, competence, and diligence” in
the performance of the agent’s functions.85 If an agent chose one
course over another because the preferred course was more
socially responsible, the agent would breach his duties of
performance only if the choice was careless or made
incompetently. The motive for the choice would implicate the
duty of loyalty, not the duty of care.86

82
Many such decisions will probably be delegated to the senior officers of the
company. In such a case, they would have the same discretion the board would,
subject to prior instructions from the board and subject to being overruled by the
board. Officers may not be subject to the business judgment rule when making
decisions, but at least one court has held that they are obligated to act in good faith
in the best interests of the corporation. See Hampshire Grp., Ltd. v. Kuttner, C.A.
No. 3607-VCS, 2010 WL 2379995, at *11 (Del. Ch. July 12, 2010) (also applying
gross negligence standard to officers’ alleged breach of the duty of care). Cf. Lyman
Johnson, Unsettledness in Delaware Corporate Law: Business Judgment Rule,
Corporate Purpose, 38 DEL. J. C ORP. L. 405, 413–15 (2013) (arguing that the
business judgment rule should not apply to officers).
83
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 8.01 cmt. b (AM. LAW INST. 2006).
84
See id. §§ 8.07–8.12.
85
See id. § 8.08.
86
Id. § 8.08 cmt. b. In fact, an agent’s acting to further the interests of someone
other than the principal is a classic breach of the duty of loyalty, not the duty of
care. See id. § 8.01 cmt. b, illus. 2; see also King v. Bankerd, 492 A.2d 608, 613 (Md.
1985) (“In short, the agent is under a duty to serve his principal with only his
principal’s purposes in mind.”). In King, which is the basis for the illustration in the
Restatement, an attorney-in-fact made a gift of the principal’s property to the
principal’s ex-wife. Id. at 610. Although the trial court held that the agent
“negligently violated the fiduciary relationship,” the appellate court’s discussion—as
well as the citation to the case in the Third Restatement—makes clear that the duty
violated was loyalty. Id. at 611, 613. But see Colombo, Ownership, Limited, supra
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The duty of loyalty is determined by the scope of the agency
relationship as created by the parties’ manifestations of
consent.87 Thus, the agent is subject to a general duty to act only
“in accordance with the principal’s manifestation of consent,”88
and to a duty of loyalty to act “solely for the benefit of the
principal” in connection with the agency relationship.89 The
Third Restatement calls this the “general fiduciary principle”
that defines the entire relationship between the principal and
agent.90 The agent does not have unfettered discretion to
determine what “the principal’s benefit” entails.91 The agent
must act based on a reasonable interpretation of the principal’s
manifestations92 to the agent.93 In the words of the Second
Restatement, the principal’s purposes, “as manifested to the
agent, constitute the benefit for which, as the agent should
realize, the agency is created.”94 The agent must make “an
honest assessment of what the principal would then wish the
agent to do,”95 and that assessment must be based on the agent’s
understanding of the principal’s objectives.96

note 64, at 269 n.159, 282 (arguing that a board’s consideration of the common good
raises duty of care concerns).
87
See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 376 cmt. a (AM. LAW INST. 1958).
88
Id. § 383. The Second Restatement includes the qualifier “[e]xcept when he is
privileged to protect his own or another’s interests . . . .” Id.
89
See id. § 387.
90
See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 8.01 (AM. LAW INST. 2006) (“An agent
has a fiduciary duty to act loyally for the principal’s benefit . . . .”). The Third
Restatement adds “loyally” and removes “solely” to clarify that it is acceptable for an
agent to receive a benefit, in the form of compensation, from her activities. Id. § 8.01
reporter’s note a.
91
Cf. Linda S. Whitton, Understanding Duties and Conflicts of Interest—A
Guide for the Honorable Agent, 117 P ENN ST. L. R EV . 1037, 1041–42 (2013)
(discussing the need for “substituted judgment” when an agent is acting under a
durable power of attorney under the Uniform Power of Attorney Act).
92
Corporate ethics codes and social responsibility statements, which are
adopted by the board, can constitute “manifestations by the principal” for the
purposes of guiding agents’ behavior. See Robert G. Kennedy, Virtue and Corporate
Culture: The Ethical Formation of Baby Wolverines, 17 REV. BUS., Winter 1995/1996,
at 10, 11.
93
See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 8.01 cmt. b (AM. LAW INST. 2006);
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 376 cmt. a (AM. LAW INST. 1958).
94
See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 39 cmt. a (AM. LAW INST. 1958).
95
Deborah DeMott, The Fiduciary Character of Agency and the Interpretation of
Instructions, in PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF FIDUCIARY LAW 321, 322 (Andrew
S. Gold & Paul B. Miller eds., 2014) [hereinafter DeMott, The Fiduciary Character of
Agency].
96
Id. at 324.
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With respect to societal or other interests, the Second
Restatement expressly states that “[i]n business enterprises, an
agent normally has no authority . . . to conduct his principal’s
business with a mind to the benefit of others.”97 Even if the
agent works for a charitable organization, “the agent serves
others only as a means of forwarding the principal’s objects.”98 A
corporate employee-agent is bound by what the employee
believes, based on manifestations by the “corporation,” to be
consistent with corporate goals. As noted above, the voice of the
corporation is the board of directors or a senior officer to whom
the board has delegated its authority to speak on any particular
subject.
In a large corporation, the CEO—or one of her
underlings—is likely to be the real decision maker on most
matters, but the CEO is nevertheless under the control of the
board of directors to the extent the board chooses to exercise that
control.99
Agency law does recognize that there are situations in which
an agent’s duty to a higher authority trumps the duty of
loyalty.100 Those situations are limited, however, to specific legal
mandates, such as disclosure of information subject to a
subpoena or to clearly articulated public policy concerns, such as
reporting illegal behavior.101 The exceptions to the duty of loyalty
have been kept narrow.102 The Third Restatement states that, in

97

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 39 cmt. a (AM. LAW INST. 1958). The
illustration accompanying the text observes that a store manager “may be found” to
have authority to make a reasonable donation to a local charity “to which merchants
generally contribute,” in order to obtain or retain good will. Id. illus. 2. In other
words, the act is still in the best interests of the principal.
98
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 39 cmt. a (AM. LAW INST. 1958).
99
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 7.07 cmt. f (AM. LAW INST. 2006).
100
The Third Restatement notes that “an agent may in some circumstances be
privileged to engage in conduct that may be adverse to a principal’s interests or that
may in some other respect depart from the principal’s wishes.” Id. § 8.01 cmt. c. The
circumstance noted is the agent’s right to keep secret the fact that the agent is
planning to quit. Id. This right is a recognition that the agent has a right to make a
living after the end of her employment. Without this recognition, anyone with a
marketable skill, or who hoped to develop a marketable skill, would be deterred from
serving as an agent.
101
Id. § 8.05 cmt. c.
102
See Fred C. Zacharias, The Lawyer as Conscientious Objector, 54 RUTGERS L.
REV. 191, 210 (2001) (noting that the author found no case law that directly
addressed whether agents may vindicate moral and societal interests in violating
their obligations to their principals); Dicomes v. State, 782 P.2d 1002, 1009–10
(Wash. 1989) (en banc) (rejecting claim that public policy protected employee who
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some instances, “general social interests circumscribe the agent’s
duties to the principal,” but it identifies only the whistleblower
cases as examples of such an exception to the duty of loyalty.103
Many courts even refuse to excuse whistleblowing where the
reported behavior does not constitute a violation of law.104
Unless one of the few narrow exceptions applies, an agent
must act according to the principal’s wishes, whether or not the
agent agrees with the principal. The agent must comply with the
principal’s manifestations, reasonably interpreted, even if the
agent believes that doing so is not, in fact, in the principal’s best
interests.105 Thus, there is no room for an agent to act outside
the stated purpose of the agency for the benefit of either the
common good or the principal’s unacknowledged moral wellbeing.106 In agency law, the principal’s right to control the agent
and define the purpose of the enterprise is virtually sacrosanct,107
which reflects the fact that the principal owns the enterprise, and
all the resources at the agent’s disposal belong to the principal.
Consider a simple example. Alpha operates a business as a
sole proprietor, and Bravo manages one of Alpha’s locations.
Bravo elects to purchase recycled bags for the store, although
they are slightly more expensive. Bravo has acted loyally to
benefit Alpha in this decision only if Bravo reasonably believes,
based on Alpha’s manifestations to him, that buying—and paying
more for—the recycled bags will benefit the business as Alpha
sees it. Thus, Bravo may purchase the bags if Alpha has

disclosed confidential information despite employee’s “arguably good faith belief in
the righteousness of her conduct . . .”).
103
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 8.01 cmt. c (AM. LAW INST. 2006).
104
See generally Dicomes, 782 P.2d at 1007–09 (collecting and summarizing
cases); Gutierrez v. Sundancer Indian Jewelry, Inc., 868 P.2d 1266, 1282 (N.M. Ct.
App. 1993), cert. denied, 117 N.M. 121 (1994) (Hartz, J., dissenting) (same).
105
See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 8.01 cmt. b (AM. LAW INST. 2006). In
the organizational context, the agent must obey the instructions of his superiors in
the organization even if he believes those instructions do not effectively advance the
goals of the organization. See DeMott, The Fiduciary Character of Agency, supra
note 95, at 325; see also id. at 327 (“[Agent] is not free to disregard what [Agent]
knows about [Principal’s] preferences, even if [Agent] believes them to be
mistaken.”).
106
See DeMott, The Fiduciary Character of Agency, supra note 95, at 329–30
(“[E]ven well-motivated departures from [Principal’s] known preferences are
inconsistent with [Agent’s] position as [Principal’s] representative,” even in
situations where the agent’s choice does not reduce the economic benefit to the
principal).
107
See id. at 321.
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indicated that she wants her business to be operated as
sustainably as possible, or if Alpha has previously indicated an
interest in sustainable products. If Bravo believes that using the
recycled bags would benefit the business, but Alpha has
previously indicated her dislike of recycled products, Bravo may
not buy the bags. Bravo is also not permitted to buy the bags if
he subjectively believes there is no business reason to do so—in
other words, if he does not believe it would benefit Alpha. The
fact that using the recycled bags has numerous benefits for
society is simply irrelevant to Bravo’s duty.108 The higherauthority exception to the duty of loyalty does not apply because
Bravo is not under any superior legal duty to buy recycled bags,
and Bravo’s act cannot fall under a whistle-blowing exception
because it presumably does not prevent Alpha from violating a
statute, regulation, or clearly stated public policy.
A real-world example of this principle recently occurred in
Tulsa, Oklahoma, where several city bus drivers were fired for
distributing free transit passes to people in need.109 The drivers
were allowed to issue passes “for improved customer service,” but
the city charged them with embezzlement for printing and
distributing nearly $38,000 in free rides.110
It has been suggested that a principal—at least a corporate
principal—knows that her agents will have their own moral and
ethical beliefs, that the principal assumes the risk that an agent
will act in accordance with generally accepted moral principles
(“GAMP”),111 and that an agent acting in accordance with GAMP
does not breach the duty of loyalty.112 This is incorrect as a
matter of law unless the GAMP in question has the force of

108

In the unlikely event of a suit, the remedy here would probably be for Bravo
to reimburse Alpha for the difference in the cost of the bags. That is, of course, what
Bravo should have done in the first place.
109
The actual facts are unclear. Several drivers are suing the city, alleging they
were fired with discriminatory intent and not for distributing free passes. They
allege that other drivers also distributed passes and were not disciplined. See Ginnie
Graham, Fired Tulsa Bus Drivers Sue in Federal Court, Alleging Race
Discrimination, TULSA WORLD (Nov. 7, 2015), http://www.tulsaworld.com/news/c
rimewatch/fired-tulsa-bus-drivers-sue-in-federal-court-allegingrace/article_c4b1597e-7ef2-5cdf-a458-23db128afdf4.html.
110
The case was dismissed because the drivers lacked criminal intent. See id.
111
See Colombo, Toward a Nexus of Virtue, supra note 24, at 57–61.
112
There is a certain absurdity in this argument: loyalty is itself a high moral
value, and the ninth circle of Hell, according to Dante, is inhabited not by thieves,
murderers, heretics, or profiteers, but traitors.
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positive law, or the agent reasonably believes that the principal
has authorized the agent to apply GAMP in the business
context.113
It has also been argued that the law should be changed to
permit an agent to take actions that do not benefit the principal
but are in accordance with socially desirable behavior and
GAMP.114 There are at least two reasons why such a change in
the law would be unwise. First, one purpose of the strict duty of
loyalty is to encourage a principal to delegate activities to agents
and to limit agency costs.115 A GAMP exception would be
sufficiently large and vague that it would increase the risks for
principals and force principals to deliver elaborate and yet
nonetheless unavoidably incomplete instructions about situations
likely to involve moral choices.116 Second, the GAMP exception
would make a difference in two situations—where the principal’s
moral choice would differ from the agent’s, and where the agent
must make a moral decision without guidance from the principal.
In the former case, the GAMP exception would privilege the
agent’s view over that of the principal with respect to an aspect of
the principal’s business, an outcome utterly contrary to every
tenet of agency law. In the latter case, current law requires that
the agent act based on the agent’s reasonable interpretation of
the principal’s wishes. If the agent legitimately believes that the
principal’s moral values are coincident with his own, then there
is no problem. If the agent believes that the principal’s moral
values differ from his own, then the agent is actually in the
former, conflict-of-value situation and must respect the fact that
his principal, not he, owns the enterprise.
It is said to be unrealistic117 and dangerous118 to require that
an agent check her morals at the door of her workplace. Such
“role morality” permits a person to separate herself from the
morality of her act and to engage in acts she would never take on

113

See DeMott, Relationships of Trust, supra note 79, at 1266.
See Colombo, Toward a Nexus of Virtue, supra note 24, at 57–65.
115
See Robert H. Sitkoff, The Economic Structure of Fiduciary Law, 91 B.U. L.
REV. 1039, 1042–44 (2011).
116
A principal is free, under current law, to express binding moral preferences
to the agent but is not required to do so in order to prevent the agent from imposing
the agent’s moral choices on the principal.
117
See Bainbridge, In Defense, supra note 76, at 1439.
118
See Colombo, Toward a Nexus of Virtue, supra note 24, at 48–49.
114
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her own behalf.119 To counter that phenomenon, goes the
argument, the law should enable and encourage agents to take
moral account of their actions.120 But in the context of an agency
relationship that is asking the wrong question. The agent must
make moral choices based on her role in the workplace, as
elsewhere in the world. But, while an agent is entitled to, and
must, act morally in conducting her own business, she is not
permitted to pass the costs of her “morality” on to a third person.
Morality includes loyalty and respect for another’s property.121
Bravo may purchase recycled products himself, but he cannot
force Alpha to pay for them. That would be no moral choice at
all. The difficult moral choice for the agent is not in deciding how
to spend other people’s money, but in deciding how to use her
own assets, including her skills, and thus even in deciding what
job to take.122 Many, perhaps most, incidents of corporate

119
See id.; Lawrence E. Mitchell, Cooperation and Constraint in the Modern
Corporation: An Inquiry into the Causes of Corporate Immorality, 73 T EX. L. R EV.
477, 513–22 (1995). It has also been argued that the structure of corporate law,
combined with common business practices, makes corporate employees more likely
to engage in wrongful behavior. See Colombo, Toward a Nexus of Virtue, supra note
24, at 52–55; Robert J. Rhee, Corporate Ethics, Agency, and the Theory of the Firm, 3
J. BUS. & TECH. L. 309, 323–29 (2008); Lawrence E. Mitchell & Theresa A.
Gabaldon, If I Only Had a Heart: Or, How Can We Identify a Corporate Morality, 76
TUL. L. REV. 1645, 1652–55 (2002); see also PIUS XI, ENCYCLICAL LETTER
QUADRAGESIMO ANNO ¶ 132 (1931) (observing that agents of a corporation can use
that form to conceal or justify severe abuses as well as petty injustices).
120
See Colombo, Toward a Nexus of Virtue, supra note 24, at 57–65; Mitchell,
supra note 119, at 526–27.
121
Even if corporate property does not belong to the corporation—because the
corporation is only a nexus of contracts—it certainly does not belong to the agent.
122
Professor Colombo notes that the borrower of a car is not expected to sacrifice
a life to protect the car. See Colombo, Toward a Nexus of Virtue, supra note 24, at 55.
This observation is inapposite. Even if the borrower of the car were an agent, rather
than a mere bailee, the duty of loyalty would not require her to commit homicide to
protect the principal’s property. The exceptions to the duty of loyalty would cover
such a situation. More to the point, if the owner of a car bails her car to an employee
to deliver flowers to a client, the employee may not have the car converted to flexfuel at the owner’s expense; she may not remove two roses from the bouquet and
give them to a sad homeless person; and, if the client is a crime boss, she may not
deliver the flowers to someone else that she believes is more deserving. She may,
however, refuse to make the delivery and take the consequences.
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wrongdoing are attributable to dishonest individual conduct,123
and requiring workers to abide by, rather than ignore, their
fiduciary duties may have a salutary effect on conduct.124
IV. THE SOCIAL DOCTRINE OF THE CATHOLIC CHURCH
While most CSR commentators ignore the law of agency, the
commentators who argue that the social doctrine of the Catholic
Church supports or mandates CSR misunderstand and misapply
Church doctrine.
A.

Teaching and Evangelization

The Church is made up of all the faithful, living and dead.125
The Magisterium of the Church—its teaching authority—is
therefore directed at, and binding upon,126 the faithful. The
Church identifies its two-fold pastoral activity as, first, helping
individuals to discover and love Christ, and, second, encouraging
the faithful to live that love in their lives and in the world.127 The
Church’s mission to preach the Gospel entails announcing moral
principles and making judgments on human affairs,128 which is,
123

See John C. Coffee, Jr., “No Soul to Damn: No Body to Kick”: An
Unscandalized Inquiry into the Problem of Corporate Punishment, 79 MICH. L. REV.
386, 396–98 (1981).
124
Petty theft, shirking, disregarding quality controls, and falsely enhancing
one’s own performance metrics at the expense of another, for example, are both
unethical and breaches of the duty of loyalty.
125
See CATECHISM OF THE CATHOLIC CHURCH ¶ 1267 (2d ed. 1997). The Code of
Canon Law explains that the “Christian faithful” constitute the “people of God” by
virtue of their baptism, and they are “called to exercise the mission which God has
entrusted to the Church.” CODEX IURIS CANONICI c.204 (Canon Law Society of
America trans., 1983) [hereinafter CIC-1983]. For the communion in the Church of
those who have died, see SECOND VATICAN ECUMENICAL COUNCIL, DOGMATIC
CONSTITUTION ON THE CHURCH LUMEN GENTIUM ¶ 49 (1964) [hereinafter LUMEN
GENTIUM].
126
CATECHISM OF THE CATHOLIC CHURCH ¶ 1269 (2d ed. 1997); PONTIFICAL
COUNCIL FOR JUSTICE AND PEACE, COMPENDIUM OF THE SOCIAL DOCTRINE OF THE
CHURCH ¶ 80 (2004) [hereinafter COMPENDIUM].
127
See COMPENDIUM, supra note 126, ¶ 525 (“[T]o discover the truth and to
choose the path that they will follow” and “to bear witness with a spirit of service to
the Gospel in the field of social activity.”); see also PAUL VI, APOSTOLIC LETTER
OCTOGESIMA ADVENIENS ¶ 48 (1971), [hereinafter OCTOGESIMA ADVENIENS],
reprinted in CATHOLIC SOCIAL THOUGHT: THE DOCUMENTARY HERITAGE 265, 283–
84 (David J. O’Brien & Thomas A. Shannon eds., 1992) [hereinafter CATHOLIC
SOCIAL THOUGHT].
128
JOHN PAUL II, ENCYCLICAL LETTER CENTESIMUS ANNUS ¶ 5 (1991)
[hereinafter CENTESIMUS ANNUS], reprinted in CATHOLIC SOCIAL THOUGHT, supra
note 127, 439, 443; CIC-1983, supra note 125, c.747, § 2.
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in essence, its social doctrine. The basis for the Church’s
teaching on social issues is its evangelization mission,
proclaiming the “truth of Christ’s love in society.”129 As Pope
Francis has made clear, the “New Evangelization” proclaimed by
Pope John Paul II130 connects causally to the Church’s social
teaching.131
The Church’s “social” teaching is not solely about social and
economic justice; rather, it is Catholic teaching, and only a
commitment to the truth of the Gospel makes Catholic social
justice possible.132 The Church’s social doctrine, like all its
teaching, seeks to “help[] man on the path of salvation.”133 It is
only in light of this goal that the Church concerns itself with
other things;134 this is its “primary and sole purpose.”135 Catholic
social doctrine therefore includes spiritual goals that are
inseparable from its concern for justice and temporal conditions.
The social and economic development that the Church promotes
is “integral human development,” which considers the whole
person, including her relationship with God.136 Catholic social

129
BENEDICT XVI, ENCYCLICAL LETTER CARITAS IN VERITATE ¶ 5 (2009)
[hereinafter CARITAS IN VERITATE].
130
There are numerous texts on the New Evangelization. A new emphasis was
officially declared in BENEDICT XVI, APOSTOLIC LETTER PORTA FIDEI ¶ 4, (2011). A
complete lengthy papal exhortation appears in EVANGELII GAUDIUM, infra note 131,
while the U.S. bishops have also published on the subject. See generally UNITED
STATES CONFERENCE OF CATHOLIC BISHOPS, Disciples Called To Witness: The New
Evangelization 3 (2012).
131
See FRANCIS, APOSTOLIC EXHORTATION EVANGELII GAUDIUM ¶ 17 (2013)
[hereinafter EVANGELII GAUDIUM]; see also id. ¶¶ 15, 24, 49; UNITED STATES.
CONFERENCE OF CATHOLIC BISHOPS, The New Evangelization and Social Justice,
http://www.usccb.org/beliefs-and-teachings/how-we-teach/new-evangelization/newevangelization-social-justice.cfm (last visited Feb. 23, 2018); COMPENDIUM, supra
note 126, ¶ 7.
132
See CARITAS IN VERITATE, supra note 129, ¶¶ 2–6; see also EVANGELII
GAUDIUM, supra note 131, ¶ 199 (noting that the Church’s “authentic option for the
poor” differs from every other ideology because it is based on love).
133
CENTESIMUS ANNUS, supra note 128, ¶ 54.
134
See id.
135
COMPENDIUM, supra note 126, ¶ 69.
136
See SECOND VATICAN ECUMENICAL COUNCIL, PASTORAL CONSTITUTION ON
THE CHURCH IN THE MODERN WORLD GAUDIUM ET SPES ¶ 10 (1965) [hereinafter
GAUDIUM ET SPES]; CARITAS IN VERITATE, supra note 129, ¶ 79; CENTESIMUS
ANNUS, supra note 128, ¶ 41.
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doctrine is not merely concerned with making life better for
humans; it is about making humans themselves more fully
human in recognizing their ultimate destiny.137
Because of this core value of the entire—spiritual—human
person, the Church teaches that those working for social justice
must work not merely for the common good, but out of love.138 In
the words of Pope Benedict: “Charity is at the heart of the
Church’s social doctrine.
Every responsibility and every
commitment spelt out by that doctrine is derived from charity
which, according to the teaching of Jesus, is the synthesis of the
entire Law.”139 The “charity” [“caritas”]140 that is at the heart of
the Church’s social doctrine is “love received and given”141—
received from God and given to God and man. Love of one’s
neighbor without caritas—that is, without a link to the love of
God—is merely “morality,” not Christianity,142 and any attempt
to build up the world without God leads to “desertification.”143
And caritas is not only linked to love of God,144 it comes from love
of God.145 Consequently, the Church calls those who are to
137
See GAUDIUM ET SPES, supra note 136, ¶ 41; CENTESIMUS ANNUS, supra note
128, ¶ 54.
138
See EVANGELII GAUDIUM, supra note 131, ¶ 165 (“God’s saving
love . . . precedes any moral and religious obligation on our part.”). Those acting for
the common good for some reason other than love of God and neighbor are perhaps
people “of good faith” who can assist the faithful in some aspects of their work, see
CARITAS IN VERITATE, supra note 129, ¶ 57, but they are not living in accordance
with Catholic social teaching. See JOHN XXIII, ENCYCLICAL LETTER PACEM IN
TERRIS ¶¶ 158–60 (1963) [hereinafter PACEM IN TERRIS], reprinted in CATHOLIC
SOCIAL THOUGHT, supra note 127, at 131, 157.
139
CARITAS IN VERITATE, supra note 129, ¶ 2; see also EVANGELII GAUDIUM,
supra note 131, ¶ 37 (stating that the first value of moral teaching is “faith working
through love”) (quoting Galatians 5:6 (New American)).
140
In the English-language version of CARITAS IN VERITATE, the word used is
“charity.” In the Latin version it is “caritas”; in the German version it is “Liebe.” I
will use the term caritas to refer to this concept throughout this Article.
141
CARITAS IN VERITATE, supra note 129, ¶ 5.
142
See BENEDICT XVI, ENCYCLICAL LETTER DEUS CARITAS EST ¶ 14 (2005)
[hereinafter DEUS CARITAS EST].
143
EVANGELII GAUDIUM, supra note 131, ¶ 86.
144
See OCTOGESIMA ADVENIENS, supra note 127, ¶ 17.
145
See CATECHISM OF THE CATHOLIC CHURCH ¶ 1822 (2d ed. 1997); LUMEN
GENTIUM, supra note 125, ¶ 42; EVANGELII GAUDIUM, supra note 131, ¶ 183;
CARITAS IN VERITATE, supra note 129, ¶ 78; DEUS CARITAS EST, supra note 142,
¶¶ 1, 17, 18, 20; JOHN XXIII, ENCYCLICAL LETTER MATER ET MAGISTRA ¶ 257 (1961)
[hereinafter MATER ET MAGISTRA], reprinted in CATHOLIC SOCIAL THOUGHT, supra
note 127, at 84, 125; SYNOD OF BISHOPS, Justice in the World (1971) [hereinafter
JUSTICE IN THE WORLD], reprinted in CATHOLIC SOCIAL THOUGHT, supra note 127,
at 288, 293–94.
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effectuate its social doctrine to undergo a personal conversion to
“transcendent love,”146 which will in turn lead them to take
responsibility for injustice.147 Development and socioeconomic
progress require that the truth of Christ’s love be itself loved and
demonstrated.148 Society cannot be made more human until
caritas prevails in human relationships;149 justice alone cannot
bring about the “union of minds and hearts” which is the basis
for real stability.150 In other words, Catholic social doctrine calls
the faithful to advance the integral human development of all
peoples, because the faithful love God.
B.

Specific Precepts of the Catholic Social Doctrine

The Church’s social doctrine provides criteria for judging the
morality and justice of political, social, and economic institutions
and systems, as well as general guidance about the nature of a
just society.151 Although the three aspects of human life—
political, social, and economic—cannot be separated for practical
purposes, this Article considers only the precepts of Church
doctrine relating to the economy and, more specifically, business.
While the Church has not endorsed a specific economic
system or set of policies, its social doctrine is quite clear about
the economic conditions that advance integral human
development: an attitude of solidarity between all people,152
worker participation in enterprise,153 just wages,154 full

146
OCTOGESIMA ADVENIENS, supra note 127, ¶ 45 (“Otherwise, . . . the most
revolutionary ideologies lead only to a change in masters.”); see also id. ¶ 48 (issuing
a “call to action” preceded by a “personal conversion”).
147
See EVANGELII GAUDIUM, supra note 131, ¶ 127; OCTOGESIMA ADVENIENS,
supra note 127, ¶ 48.
148
CARITAS IN VERITATE, supra note 129, ¶ 5; see also JUSTICE IN THE WORLD,
supra note 145, at 310; JOHN PAUL II, ENCYCLICAL LETTER SOLLICITUDO REI
SOCIALIS ¶ 40 (1987) [hereinafter SOLLICITUDO REI SOCIALIS], reprinted in
CATHOLIC SOCIAL THOUGHT, supra note 127, at 395, 424.
149
See JOHN PAUL II, ENCYCLICAL LETTER DIVES IN MISERICORDIA ¶ 14 (1980)
[hereinafter DIVES IN MISERICORDIA] (referring to “merciful love”).
150
QUADRAGESIMO ANNO, supra note 119, ¶ 137.
151
See Robert G. Kennedy, Corporations, Common Goods, and Human Persons,
4 AVE MARIA L. REV. 1, 5–6 (2006).
152
See, e.g., CATECHISM OF THE CATHOLIC CHURCH ¶ 1941 (2d ed. 1997).
153
See PACEM IN TERRIS, supra note 138, ¶¶ 18, 20; MATER ET MAGISTRA, supra
note 145, ¶ 82.
154
See MATER ET MAGISTRA, supra note 145, ¶ 71.
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employment,155 and a more equitable distribution of goods among
men, among other things.156 More generally, economic life should
be inspired by Christian principles.157 The economy in all its
facets should respect the dignity of the whole person because the
economy is human activity.158 Of course, the economy is not an
independent actor; it is made up of individual decisions and
decision makers, and so the concrete prescriptions of the
Church’s social doctrine relating to the economy are directed at
how humans behave in their various economic roles: owner and
worker.159 The Church’s social doctrine also addresses the role of
businesses in general and corporations specifically.
1.

Ownership of Property

Many of a person’s economic roles involve decisions about the
use of her property, and Catholic social doctrine is quite specific
about the obligations of the faithful in that regard. First of all,
the Church emphasizes the doctrine of the universal destination
of goods: God gave creation to man in common, and, although we
have adopted a system of private property for a variety of
primarily consequentialist reasons, those property rights are
limited by duties reflecting the claims of the common good.160
This limitation has a number of consequences. First, and
obviously, it is wrong to use one’s property to seek to increase
one’s wealth by unjust or unlawful means.161 Second, one must
give one’s property to those in need.162 Caritas may require that

155
See JOHN PAUL II, POST-SYNODAL APOSTOLIC EXHORTATION CHRISTIFIDELES
LAICI ¶ 43 (1988) [hereinafter CHRISTIFIDELES LAICI].
156
LUMEN GENTIUM, supra note 125, ¶ 36; see also CATECHISM OF THE
CATHOLIC CHURCH ¶¶ 2403–06 (2d ed. 1997).
157
QUADRAGESIMO ANNO, supra note 119, ¶ 136.
158
See CARITAS IN VERITATE, supra note 129, ¶¶ 45, 65.
159
See id. ¶¶ 37, 65, 66; CENTESIMUS ANNUS, supra note 128, ¶ 36; see also
QUADRAGESIMO ANNO, supra note 119, ¶ 141 (“[T]he apostles of the industrial and
commercial world should themselves be employers and merchants.”).
160
See GAUDIUM ET SPES, supra note 136, ¶ 69; CENTESIMUS ANNUS, supra note
128, ¶ 43; JOHN PAUL II, ENCYCLICAL LETTER LABOREM EXERCENS ¶ 14 (1981)
[hereinafter LABOREM EXERCENS], reprinted in CATHOLIC SOCIAL THOUGHT, supra
note 127, at 352, 378; PACEM IN TERRIS, supra note 138, ¶ 22; MATER ET MAGISTRA,
supra note 145, ¶¶ 19–20; QUADRAGESIMO ANNO, supra note 119, ¶¶ 44–52; LEO
XIII, ENCYCLICAL LETTER RERUM NOVARUM ¶¶ 4–14, 19 (1891) [hereinafter RERUM
NOVARUM], reprinted in CATHOLIC SOCIAL THOUGHT, supra note 127, at 14, 14.
161
See CENTESIMUS ANNUS, supra note 128, ¶ 43; QUADRAGESIMO ANNO, supra
note 119, ¶ 134.
162
See RERUM NOVARUM, supra note 160, ¶ 22.
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one give not only from one’s superfluous income, but out of one’s
own needs as well.163 Pope Paul VI exhorted each person to
examine his conscience: “Is he prepared to support out of his own
pocket works and undertakings organized in favor of the most
destitute? Is he ready to pay higher taxes so that the public
authorities can intensify their efforts in favor of development?”164
The obligation must be satisfied from one’s own resources.165
Third, one should not be too attached to material wealth and
property. One should have “interior freedom” with regard to
one’s goods and abilities.166 Observation of the “right order” of
values will lead the faithful to lives “permeated with the spirit of
the beatitudes, notably with a spirit of poverty.”167 Owners
should use their goods with moderation, “reserving the better
part for guests, for the sick and the poor.”168 Individuals must
beware the dangers of consumerism, which can prevent a person
from truly “being.”169 Consumer choices also have a moral
dimension and should be made accordingly.170 “[E]very economic
decision has a moral consequence,”171 and created goods
themselves can be used to advance general progress.172
Fourth, decisions about savings and investment, and the
productive use of property in general, must consider the common
good.173 A reasonable return on investment is just, but property
163
See CENTESIMUS ANNUS, supra note 128, ¶ 36; GAUDIUM ET SPES, supra note
136, ¶ 69. Loving one’s neighbor calls for sacrifice and perhaps suffering, which
unites the actor with Christ and serves to build up the body of Christ on earth. See
PAUL VI, ENCYCLICAL LETTER POPULORUM PROGRESSIO ¶ 79 (1967) [hereinafter
POPULORUM PROGRESSIO], reprinted in CATHOLIC SOCIAL THOUGHT, supra note 127,
at 240, 253.
164
POPULORUM PROGRESSIO, supra note 163, ¶ 47; see also OCTOGESIMA
ADVENIENS, supra note 127, ¶ 23 (“[T]he more fortunate should renounce some of
their rights so as to place their goods more generously at the service of others.”).
165
See PACEM IN TERRIS, supra note 138, ¶ 35; MATER ET MAGISTRA, supra note
145, ¶ 121. Canon Law emphasizes this, and notes that clergy should be paid enough
so that they can give from their personal income. CIC-1983, supra note 125, c.222,
§ 2. Canon Law requires that the faithful support the Church, with time and talent
if not with cash.
166
OCTOGESIMA ADVENIENS, supra note 127, ¶ 45.
167
GAUDIUM ET SPES, supra note 136, ¶ 72.
168
CATECHISM OF THE CATHOLIC CHURCH ¶ 2405 (2d ed. 1997).
169
SOLLICITUDO REI SOCIALIS, supra note 148, ¶ 28.
170
See CARITAS IN VERITATE, supra note 129, ¶ 66; CENTESIMUS ANNUS, supra
note 128, ¶ 36.
171
CARITAS IN VERITATE, supra note 129, ¶ 37 (emphasis omitted).
172
See LUMEN GENTIUM, supra note 125, ¶ 36.
173
See CENTESIMUS ANNUS, supra note 128, ¶ 36; CATECHISM OF THE CATHOLIC
CHURCH ¶ 2405 (2d ed. 1997).
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must be used “in accordance with faith and right reason.”174
Because of the importance of meaningful work to the
development of the complete person,175 Catholic social doctrine
encourages investment in activities that create employment
opportunities satisfying the requirements of solidarity.176
Investment has other potential moral implications of course. For
example, Pope Benedict XVI specifically recognized the
existence—and danger—of social choice investment funds; the
faithful must consider whether financial opportunities respect
“the inviolable dignity of the human person and the transcendent
value of natural moral norms.”177 Persons with assets engaged in
business are similarly bound. Business owners must “respect
concretely the human dignity” of their workers and strive to
operate their businesses so as to promote the family.178
In general, the faithful should avoid using their property in
ways that increase inappropriate inequalities in wealth.179 One
must recognize that one’s possessions are not entirely one’s
own—they are “common in the sense that they should be able to
benefit not only him but also others.”180 In short, the general
obligation to act with caritas applies to a person’s use of her
property as to all her actions.181

174

QUADRAGESIMO ANNO, supra note 119, ¶ 136.
See infra notes 184–193 and accompanying text.
176
See CENTESIMUS ANNUS, supra note 128, ¶ 36; see also QUADRAGESIMO
ANNO, supra note 119, ¶ 51 (recommending such investment as a use for superfluous
income).
177
CARITAS IN VERITATE, supra note 129, ¶ 45. The Pope notes that “ethical”
financing might mean anything, including “decisions and choices contrary to justice
and authentic human welfare,” and that one needs a “sound criterion of
discernment.” Id.
178
COMPENDIUM, supra note 126, ¶¶ 344–45.
179
CARITAS IN VERITATE, supra note 129, ¶ 32.
180
GAUDIUM ET SPES, supra note 136, ¶ 69.
181
Cf. SOLLICITUDO REI SOCIALIS, supra note 148, ¶ 47 (exhorting everyone to
“implement . . . by the use of their resources . . . the measures inspired by solidarity
and love of preference for the poor”).
175
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Work

Catholic social doctrine also focuses substantial attention on
work and workers.182 Work must be more than simply a means to
live.183 It has an essential spiritual component: It contributes to
the spiritual good of the laborer and contributes to the work of
Christ.184 Every person has a duty to work,185 but work is defined
broadly as any human activity.186 Work is essential to the worker
for a number of reasons. Ideally, one fulfills one’s calling through
work;187 in any event, one is obeying God’s commandment by
working.188 One also develops oneself as a person through
work.189 Through work, one contributes to the good of others; not
only one’s co-workers and the enterprise in which one works, but
also one’s family and society in general.190 A worker shares in
God’s work of creation191 and, also, because work invariably
involves some kind of toil, in Christ’s suffering on the cross.192
Work provides, moreover, an opportunity to live with caritas.193
3.

Business

In addition to work and ownership of property, which are
themselves business activities,194 Catholic social doctrine has
specific observations and prescriptions related to businesses.195
Businesses should produce “useful goods and services,”196 create
182
See LABOREM EXERCENS, supra note 160, ¶ 3 (“[H]uman work is a key,
probably the essential key, to the whole social question.”) (emphasis in original).
183
See GAUDIUM ET SPES, supra note 136, ¶ 36; QUADRAGESIMO ANNO, supra
note 119, ¶ 135.
184
See MATER ET MAGISTRA, supra note 145, ¶ 259; LABOREM EXERCENS, supra
note 160, ¶¶ 24–27.
185
See GAUDIUM ET SPES, supra note 136, ¶ 67.
186
See LABOREM EXERCENS, supra note 160, ¶ 1. The Pope goes on to explain
that work is “transitive”—through work, one directs oneself toward an external
object. Id. ¶ 4.
187
Id. ¶ 6.
188
See id.
189
See id. ¶¶ 24–26.
190
See id. ¶ 16.
191
See id. ¶ 25.
192
See id. ¶ 27.
193
See CENTESIMUS ANNUS, supra note 128, ¶ 41; GAUDIUM ET SPES, supra note
136, ¶ 67.
194
See CARITAS IN VERITATE, supra note 129, ¶ 41.
195
As discussed below, the use of “business” or “a business” as the grammatical
subject of a sentence can present difficulties, especially when referring to morality or
intentionality.
196
COMPENDIUM, supra note 126, ¶ 338.
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wealth for their owners and contracting parties,197 produce highquality goods and services, and promote the well-being of their
employees.198 On the other hand, businesses should avoid
corruption, the irresponsible destruction of natural resources,
and the exploitation of workers, especially in developing
nations.199 Businesses by their nature serve a social function by
“creating opportunities for meeting, cooperating and the
enhancement of the abilities of the people involved,”200 and profit
is not to be pursued without regard to its social and human costs.
The “demands of the common good . . . must also be borne in
mind when assessing the rate of return due as compensation to
the company’s management, and as interest or dividends to
investors.”201
However, Catholic social doctrine is about more than
improving the social value of business. It includes exhortations
consistent with the Church’s evangelical mission. The lay
faithful are to be apostles in their roles as employers and
merchants,202 and a business must not neglect “the authentic
values that bring about the concrete development of the person
and society,”203 presumably including the spiritual values
described above. While these observations purport to relate to
businesses, they are in fact about the behavior of humans. Those
actors are variously “business owners and management,”204
“employers,”205 “those responsible for business enterprises”206 and
“[a]ll those involved in a business venture.”207 Vaguer terms,
such as “individuals and private enterprise,” are often used as

197

See id.
See CENTESIMUS ANNUS, supra note 128, ¶ 36.
199
See id. ¶ 43.
200
COMPENDIUM, supra note 126, ¶ 338; see also CENTESIMUS ANNUS, supra
note 128, ¶ 43 (describing business as a “society of persons” where integral human
development “promotes the greater productivity and efficiency of work itself”).
201
MATER ET MAGISTRA, supra note 145, ¶ 81 (emphasis omitted).
202
OCTOGESIMA ADVENIENS, supra note 127, ¶ 48.
203
COMPENDIUM, supra note 126, ¶ 338 (emphasis omitted).
204
Id. ¶ 344.
205
CATECHISM OF THE CATHOLIC CHURCH ¶ 1941 (2d ed. 1997); CONGREGATION
FOR THE DOCTRINE OF THE FAITH, INSTRUCTION ON CHRISTIAN FREEDOM AND
LIBERATION LIBERTATIS CONSCIENTIA ¶ 83 (1986) [hereinafter LIBERTATIS
CONSCIENTIA].
206
CATECHISM OF THE CATHOLIC CHURCH ¶¶ 2430, 2432 (2d ed. 1997).
207
COMPENDIUM, supra note 126, ¶ 339.
198
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well,208 but, when economic and financial institutions create
injustice, “it is not the instrument that must be called to account,
but individuals, their moral conscience and their personal and
social responsibility.”209
C.

Catholic Social Doctrine and Corporations: Vicarious Charity

Because Catholic social doctrine calls for the faithful to bring
caritas to the world, it cannot apply to corporations. Clearly an
institution cannot actually act with caritas, which has an
emotional component. Nor can humans somehow act so that
caritas is imputed to the corporation. It is impossible for a
faithful member of the Church to carry out the Church’s mission
or advance Catholic social justice, which requires a commitment
to the Gospel, on someone else’s behalf—that is, as an agent—
unless the principal shares the agent’s spiritual motivation. The
concept of representation or substitution has an important place
in Catholic theology,210 but a relationship with God must arise
from a free response and acceptance in which a person “commits
his whole self freely to God.”211 A person must act without
external pressure; “no man has the capacity to force internal
compliance on another.”212 It follows that a person must feel
caritas personally; the caritas of one person cannot be imputed to
another.213
208

See, e.g., LIBERTATIS CONSCIENTIA, supra note 205, ¶ 85; see also CATECHISM
CATHOLIC CHURCH ¶ 2433 (2d ed. 1997) (“[S]ociety should, according to
circumstances, help citizens find work and employment.”).
209
CARITAS IN VERITATE, supra note 129, ¶ 36; see also OCTOGESIMA
ADVENIENS, supra note 127, ¶ 48.
210
Most fundamentally, Jesus took upon himself the sins of the world and
therefore, to oversimplify grossly, redeemed us vicariously. CATECHISM OF THE
CATHOLIC CHURCH ¶ 1992 (2d ed. 1997). Moreover, Christians can participate in the
redemption of others through prayer. See Jacques Servais, S.J., Postscript, in HANS
U RS VON B ALTHASAR & A DRIENNE VON SPEYR, T O THE H EART OF THE MYSTERY
OF R EDEMPTION 129–30 (2010). One’s own works “enable us to collaborate in the
salvation of others” by building up the Church. CATECHISM OF THE CATHOLIC
CHURCH ¶ 2003 (2d ed. 1997).
211
PAUL VI, DOGMATIC CONSTITUTION ON DIVINE REVELATION DEI VERBUM ¶ 5
(1965).
212
PACEM IN TERRIS, supra note 138, ¶ 48; see also DEUS CARITAS EST, supra
note 142, ¶ 16.
213
Cf. Charles J. Chaput, O.F.M. Cap., “We Have No King But Caesar:” Some
Thoughts on Catholic Faith and Public Life, 58 VILL. L. REV. 371, 377 (2013) (“The
obligation to seek and serve the truth belongs to each of us personally . . . . We can’t
ignore or delegate away these personal duties to anyone else or any government
agency.”).
OF THE
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Unlike caritas itself, an agent’s good works can be imputed
to the principal, as when a person directs another to distribute
alms on her behalf. However, neither the love nor the works can
be imputed when an actor is using another person’s goods
without that person’s consent, because that by definition is not
an act of caritas at all.214 For one thing, the obligation of caritas
requires sacrifice of self; sacrificing another would not have any
spiritual value for either the actor or the unwitting donor, and it
would not serve as a very convincing witness of the Gospel.
Additionally, causing another person to suffer, even for the
common good, would violate other fundamental moral principles,
including respect for the rights of others215 and, in some cases,
fidelity to one’s obligations.216 Thus, vicarious caritas217 could
exist only when one person used his own property or other gifts
out of love for God and neighbor and offered that love and
sacrifice for the benefit of another’s soul. But that is not CSR.
V.

PERSONAL SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY

If Catholic social doctrine has little to say to corporations
and corporate, or other, agents, how can it relate at all to the
world of business? The answer is that it relates to individuals in
their business activities, but only to the extent that they are
acting on their own behalf, as principals, and not as agents.218
This is true because only individuals are capable of the caritas
that enables true social justice,219 as the Church sees it. In the
214
One may not engage in charity with another person’s goods. See ST. THOMAS
AQUINAS, SUMMA THEOLOGIAE, pt. II-II, Q. 32, art. 8 (2d ed. 1920) (1266–1273)
(“[H]e that is under another’s power must not give alms of anything in respect of
which he is subject to that other.”). If the principal directs the agent to give alms,
the caritas—and presumably the property—is the principal’s; it is not imputed from
the agent.
215
See CATECHISM OF THE CATHOLIC CHURCH ¶¶ 2407–08 (2d ed. 1997). This
would be treating another as a means, rather than as an end in herself. See id.
¶ 2407.
216
See id. ¶¶ 2410–11.
217
This author has not been able to identify any such doctrine in an
authoritative source. Cf. id. ¶ 2010 (“Moved by the Holy Spirit . . . we can then merit
for ourselves and for others the graces needed for our sanctification, for the increase
of grace and charity, and for the attainment of eternal life.”) (emphasis added).
218
This focus is consistent with Catholic moral teaching, which focuses on the
actor and the effect of sin on the actor, not on the harm caused by the sin. See M.
Cathleen Kaveny, Appropriation of Evil: Cooperation’s Mirror Image, 61
THEOLOGICAL STUD. 280, 303 (2000).
219
See supra Part IV.C; see also BENEDICT XVI, MESSAGE FOR LENT (2013).
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world of business, corporations are not the only principals;
owners of property are also principals when they are dealing with
their own property. Thus, Catholic social doctrine applies to
business owners, investors, and consumers, who are also the vast
majority of the human beings in the United States.
In 2016, almost 150 million Americans were employed;220
only about 2.6 million of those can be categorized as senior
While almost 25 million people work in
management.221
“management, business, and financial operations,”222 almost 27
million are in “service” occupations such as “health care” support
or “food preparation,” 33.5 million are in sales, office, and
administrative positions, almost 14 million are in “natural
resources, construction, and maintenance,” and almost 18 million
are in production and transportation occupations.223 At the risk
of overgeneralizing, over 93 million employees are likely to have
little significant decision-making authority at work.224
Significant numbers of Americans own their own businesses,
however.
In 2013, there were 24.3 million “nonemployer”
establishments.225 In 2016, thirteen percent of households owned

220

U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, CURRENT POPULATION
SURVEY tbl.11 (2016), https://www.bls.gov/cps/cpsa2016.pdf (last visited Jan. 23,
2018).
221
These are “chief executives” and “general operations managers.” Id.
222
This category includes food service managers, education administrators,
claims adjusters, event planners, and accountants. Id.
223
U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, QUARTERLY CENSUS OF
EMPLOYMENT AND WAGES (2016), https://data.bls.gov/cew/apps/table_maker/v4/tab
le_maker.htm#type=12&year=2016&size=0,1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9&agg=23&supp=1 (last
visited July 8, 2018).
224
U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, CURRENT POPULATION
SURVEY supra note 220. Nor are workers likely to have close contact with the owners
of the business. Although there are relatively few large workplaces, 87.2 million
people worked in workplaces with more than 20 employees. Id. at tbl.12. While
meaningful participation in work is a goal of the Church’s social doctrine, a
significant proportion of the lay faithful in the United States probably do not have it.
On the other hand, the Wall Street Journal reports that more than three-quarters of
surveyed employees say they have no desire to move up in their organizations
because they are happy and fulfilled in their current job. Sue Shellenbarger, Would
You Refuse a Promotion To Stay in a Job You Love?, WALL ST. J. (July 16, 2013,
11:05 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB1000142412788732434850457860976
2637492762.
225
U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, GEOGRAPHIC AREA SERIES: NONEMPLOYER STATISTICS
BY LEGAL FORM OF ORGANIZATION FOR THE U.S. AND STATES (2015),
https://factfinder.census.gov/faces/tableservices/jsf/pages/productview.xhtml?pid=NE
S_2015_00A1&prodType=table (last visited Jan. 23, 2018). These are people working
alone, such as independent contractors. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, NONEMPLOYER
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all or part of a business;226 as of 2010, the last year for which data
was reported, ninety-four percent had an active role in the
business they owned.227 Far more invest in businesses run by
others: By various accounts, about half of American households
invest in the stock market, directly or through mutual funds,
retirement plans, and similar vehicles.228 It is in these roles—as
workers and owners—that individuals can freely act to advance
social justice, and it is to individuals in these roles that the
Church speaks.
A.

Issues in the Workplace

It is difficult to imagine more than a day or two passing in
the life of the average worker without an opportunity for the
practice of personal caritas,229 and even ordinary workers will
occasionally, perhaps often, be presented with thorny moral
issues and will be called upon to make decisions that implicate
Catholic moral and social teaching more directly. Workers in fact
have asked questions such as:

STATISTICS, https://www.census.gov/econ/overview/mu0500.html (last visited Dec. 2,
2017).
226
Changes in U.S. Family Finances from 2013 to 2016: Evidence from the
Survey of Consumer Finances, 103 FED. RES. BULL., Sept. 2017, at 21 box 6, 28 box 9.
227
Changes in U.S. Family Finances from 2007 to 2010: Evidence from the
Survey of Consumer Finances, 98 FED. RES. BULL., June 2012, at 47 tbl.9, 51–52.
228
Id. at 24; see also Jeffrey M. Jones, U.S. Stock Ownership Down Among All
But Older, Higher-Income, GALLUP NEWS (May 24, 2017), http://news.gallup.com/
poll/211052/stock-ownership-down-among-older-higher-income.aspx.
229
Pope Francis’s encyclical, EVANGELII GAUDIUM, supra note 131, suggests
that the faithful must overcome suspicion of others and abandon their defensive
attitudes. ¶ 88. They should learn to suffer in Christ when they are unjustly
attacked or met with ingratitude, id. ¶ 91, and tolerate the nuisances in life, id. ¶ 92.
A person with caritas prays for someone who makes her angry, id. ¶ 101, and serves
as a peacemaker in her community, id. ¶ 239. The faithful must respect migrants
and those of other faiths, id. ¶ 253, must stand firm in faith when faced with
setbacks and frustrations, id. ¶ 277–80, and must not try to appear better than
others, id. ¶ 271. In fact, Chapter V of EVANGELII GAUDIUM is a set of vivid
instructions for the laity. The Pope clearly expects that they will be carried out in
the workplace, producing “nurses with soul, teachers with soul, politicians with
soul.” Id. ¶ 273.
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 May a mechanic or clerical employee continue working for





a business that cheats people?230
May a customer service worker or desk clerk implement
evasive or devious policies?231
May employees allow an employer’s defects or wrongdoing
to hurt others?232
May salespeople push products on which extra
commission is paid?233
May an employer hire undocumented workers in violation
of the law?234

Such questions suggest that employees understand the
implications of the duty of loyalty better than many legal
scholars do.235
Questions such as those listed above implicate the moral
doctrine of “cooperation with evil.” Put very simply, participating
in an objectionable act is always forbidden if the cooperator
shares the wrongful intent of the primary actor; this is “formal
cooperation.”236 When a person’s act contributes to the wrongful
act of another, and the cooperator foresees that her action will
help the wrongdoer but does not intend that the wrong occur, the
cooperator’s act is “material cooperation.”237 In cases of material
cooperation, the permissibility of the act is determined on a caseby-case basis. Thus, in some circumstances an employee may be
able to do her job even if she knows that the enterprise in which
she works will commit some wrongful act, as long as she does not
intend that act.238
Material cooperation “can be immoral,
however, because it can lead to sharing bad intentions, lead
others into sin, impair one’s witness to relevant moral truth,
and/or be unfair to those injured by the wrongdoing to which it
contributes.”239 Relevant factors include how badly the employee
needs the job, whether the employee’s resignation is likely to
230
See GERMAIN GRISEZ, 3 THE WAY OF THE LORD JESUS: DIFFICULT MORAL
QUESTIONS 543, 544 (1997). Professor Grisez has also been asked questions about
the morality of tax evasion and theft of employer resources.
231
Id. at 548, 551.
232
Id. at 555.
233
Id. at 576.
234
Id. at 735.
235
Cf. Colombo, Toward a Nexus of Virtue, supra note 24, at 38–39 (arguing that
low-level employees do not face moral issues).
236
See GRISEZ, supra note 230, at 872–74.
237
See id.
238
See id. at 876–86.
239
See id. at 546–47.
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hinder or advance the evil behavior, and whether the employee
has the opportunity to ameliorate the effects of the bad behavior
by staying employed.240
Employers, or their attorneys, can, and probably do, provide
instruction on the duty of loyalty as part of their regular
employee training, but they probably do not provide guidance for
employees who face personal moral dilemmas because of the
demands of their employers. Oddly, the Church does not provide
much formal guidance on this subject either.241 While legal
scholarship is unlikely to be more available to low-level
employees than moral theology, lawyers and legal commentators
could help employers establish policies that recognize and
encourage loyal, moral behavior on the part of employees. Such
policies might reduce the likelihood that employees will engage
in harmful, disloyal, and immoral acts. Moreover, a greater
recognition of individual moral responsibility in general might
improve the business’s culture of behavior.242

240

See, e.g., id. at 543–48. Material cooperation:
[I]s licit when the action is good or indifferent in itself; and when one has a
reason for doing it that is both just and proportioned to the gravity of the
other’s sin and to the closeness of the assistance which is [thereby] given to
the carrying out of that sin.
Id. at 876 (quoting St. Alphonsus Ligouri) (alteration in original).
241
In contrast, the Church has many resources available to help the faithful live
according to Church teaching in their family lives and as citizens. The U.S.C.C.B.
has a section of its website dedicated to “Marriage and Family” that includes dozens
of Bishops’ Letters, Church documents, FAQs, and other documents. See UNITED
STATES CONFERENCE OF CATHOLIC BISHOPS, Marriage and Family,
http://www.usccb.org/issues-and-action/marriage-and-family/index.cfm (last visited
Jan. 23, 2018). The Bishops also have a portal on Faithful Citizenship, which focuses
on “Forming Consciences for Faithful Citizenship” and includes a bulletin insert and
parish guide, as well as links to other documents. See UNITED STATES CONFERENCE
OF CATHOLIC BISHOPS, Forming Consciences for Faithful Citizenship, http://www.u
sccb.org/issues-and-action/faithful-citizenship/index.cfm (last visited Jan. 23, 2018).
The “Human Life and Dignity” Portal includes links to Vatican statements on social
justice, as well as other statements of principles, but has little designed to educate
the laity about how to implement the social doctrine of the Church in their own lives.
See UNITED STATES CONFERENCE OF CATHOLIC BISHOPS, Human Life and Dignity,
http://www.usccb.org/issues-and-action/human-life-and-dignity/ (last visited Jan. 23,
2018).
242
See Scott Berinato, To Stop Bad Behavior, Display a Virtuous Quote, HARV.
BUS. REV., Jan.–Feb. 2016, at 34–35 (describing study in which subjects were less
likely to ask colleagues to engage in unethical behavior if those colleagues had a
quote about integrity in their email signatures).
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More importantly, there are many aspects of the Church’s
social teaching that are applicable to ordinary work. The
requirements of caritas are personal, which is to say, they apply
in person-to-person interactions. An employee cannot spend her
employer’s resources on socially desirable but more expensive
supplies, but she can support her co-workers in difficulty, she can
treat customers—including immigrants and “undesirables”—with
courtesy and kindness, and she can mediate workplace disputes
and step away from petty jealousies. She can, moreover, provide
opportunities for her co-workers and subordinates to have
greater participation in their workplaces and to have more
meaningful work experiences.243
These are small steps to
advancing authentic human dignity, and thus are real ways that
real people can advance social justice.244
Many proponents of corporate social responsibility might
question the relevance of this kind of daily ethics to CSR. There
are three answers to that question. First, the Church’s social
doctrine does not demand reform as an end in itself. The Church
is in the business of promoting caritas, not social programs.245
Second, a large-scale conversion to caritas would go a long way to
accomplishing social justice.246 Third, it has been argued that
individuals working for corporations are less likely to make
moral decisions,247 and that mid-level and low-level employees
are particularly likely to engage in illegal or undesirable
behavior.248 If those arguments are true, then focusing on

243
See H.B. ACTON, THE MORALS OF MARKETS AND RELATED ESSAYS 23, 49
(David Gordon & Jeremy Shearmur, eds. 1993) (“[T]his does not mean that even the
Christian virtues must be absent from the business world altogether. Between the
members of a firm or between its employees there is plenty of scope for humility and
charity, and perhaps even for self-sacrifice as well.”).
244
See BENEDICT XVI, ENCYCLICAL LETTER SPE SALVI ¶ 48 (2007) [hereinafter
SPE SALVI] (“As Christians we should . . . ask: what can I do in order that others
may be saved . . . ?).
245
See EVANGELII GAUDIUM, supra note 131, ¶ 199. Pope Francis made this
point in one of his first public statements as Pope. See FRANCIS, HOMILY MISSA PRO
ECCLESIA (2013) (“We can walk as much as we want, we can build many things, but
if we do not profess Jesus Christ, things go wrong. We may become a charitable
NGO, but not the Church, the Bride of the Lord.”).
246
See CONGREGATION FOR THE DOCTRINE OF THE FAITH, INSTRUCTION ON
CERTAIN ASPECTS OF THE “THEOLOGY OF LIBERATION” ¶¶ 3, 15 (1984).
247
Coffee, Jr., supra note 123, 389–90, 392–93, 395–96, 398.
248
Id. at 397.
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ordinary workers might have more of an effect on the social
behavior of corporations than additional exhortations directed
toward top management.249
B.

Ownership of Property

As noted above, Catholic social doctrine calls for the payment
of just wages, promotion of global human development,
protection of the environment, and respect for human life, among
other things—in other words, social responsibility. While a
corporate employee is not permitted, consistent with her duty of
loyalty, to undertake those initiatives sua sponte at work—that
is, with her employer’s property—she is permitted, and even
required, to consider those goals in her use of her own property.
1.

Use of Property as a Consumer

It is probably safe to say that every American over the age of
twelve has made a decision as a consumer.250 Those decisions
involve a moral act,251 not only in the choices of how much to
spend and what to spend it on,252 but also in the choice of from
whom to purchase.253 From the perspective of the Church’s social

249
There are numerous resources calling, or recalling, top managers to bear
witness in their lives. See, e.g., HELEN J. A LFORD, O.P., & MICHAEL J. N AUGHTON ,
MANAGING AS IF F AITH MATTERED: C HRISTIAN SOCIAL P RINCIPLES IN THE
MODERN O RGANIZATION (2001); P ONTIFICAL C OUNCIL FOR JUSTICE AND P EACE,
V OCATION OF THE B USINESS L EADER: A R EFLECTION (2012); B USINESS ,
R ELIGION, & SPIRITUALITY: A N EW SYNTHESIS (Oliver F. Williams ed. 2003);
L AURA L. N ASH, B ELIEVERS IN B USINESS (1994). There are also a variety of
organizations devoted to supporting Christian managers. See, e.g., Fellowship of
Companies for Christ International, http://www.fcci.org/ (last visited Jan. 23, 2018);
International Christian Chamber of Commerce, http://iccc.net/ (last visited Jan. 23,
2018); Ask Wise Counsel, http://www.askwisecounsel.com/ (last visited Jan. 23,
2018); C12 GROUP, http://www.c12group.com/ (last visited Jan. 23, 2018) (for
Christian CEOs and owners). But see Abellin, Oklahoma Publisher Prays with, Fires
25 Workers, ABC NEWS (June 8, 2012), http://abcnews.go.com/Business/oklahomacompany-fires-25-employees-amid-outsourcing-rumors/story?id=16520756.
250
Average after-tax income per household in the United States in 2016 was
about $64,000, and average annual expenditures were over $57,000. U.S. BUREAU OF
LABOR STATISTICS, CONSUMER EXPENDITURE SURVEY (2016), tbl.1300, https://www.
bls.gov/cex/2016/combined/age.pdf (last visited Dec. 2, 2017).
251
See CARITAS IN VERITATE, supra note 129, ¶ 66; CENTESIMUS ANNUS, supra
note 128, ¶ 36.
252
Cf. SPE SALVI, supra note 244, ¶ 39 (“[W]e need witnesses . . . if we are to
prefer goodness to comfort, even in the little choices we face each day.”).
253
See Gerald J. Beyer, Workers’ Rights and Socially Responsible Investment in
the Catholic Tradition: A Case Study, 10 J. CATH. SOC. THOUGHT 117, 142 n.103
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doctrine—as opposed to Christian teaching generally—the
relevant issue in both spending and saving is the practices of the
businesses involved.254 For example, one can purchase only fair
trade coffee or prefer brand-name Tylenol, manufactured by a
company that purports to operate according to a socially
responsible “credo,”255 to generic acetaminophen. The point of
making such consumer decisions is not to change the behavior of
sellers or manufacturers,256 but rather to operate one’s own
business—that is, purchasing—in accordance with one’s moral
views and Church teaching.
There are severe practical constraints on consumers trying
to make moral choices when purchasing goods. The first is the
lack of a meaningful choice of items. Recycled products and fair
trade coffee are more expensive than their unsustainable
counterparts, and many Americans cannot afford to make those
choices.257 It might be difficult to find any ready-made clothing
untouched by unfair or unsafe labor practices, no matter how
much one is willing to spend. The second problem is a lack of
information.258 Most purchasing decisions must be made in the
absence of reliable information about the producers of the goods
or services being purchased. We cannot trace the food we buy to
the domestic producer who has given us salmonella, much less
determine what labor practices are being used by the vendor’s
sub-sub-contractor in Asia. And manufacturing is only one
step—where and how was the cotton grown and spun or the
acrylic fiber produced?259 However, the literature on corporate
(2013); and Kaveny, supra note 218, at 286 (discussing moral responsibility for
purchasing decisions).
254
Cf. CATECHISM OF THE CATHOLIC CHURCH ¶ 2504 (2d. ed 1997) (“Those who
hold goods for use and consumption should use them with moderation, reserving the
better part for guests, for the sick and the poor.”).
255
See Our Credo, JOHNSON & JOHNSON, http://www.jnj.com/about-jnj/jnj-credo
(last visited Jan. 23, 2018).
256
Cf. Elhauge, supra note 81, at 750–51 (arguing that consumer activists are
acting for social and moral reasons but are unlikely to change corporate behavior).
257
The fact that one cannot afford recycled products on one’s meager salary does
not, of course, justify using someone else’s money to pay for them. Cf. Benjamin
Harrison (attributed): “I pity the man who wants a coat so cheap that the man or
woman who produces the cloth will starve in the process.”
258
See CARITAS IN VERITATE, supra note 129, ¶ 66; Elhauge, supra note 81, at
750.
259
Various disclosure systems relating to labor conditions and environmental
practices have been proposed. See, e.g., David J. Doorey, Who Made That?:
Influencing Foreign Labour Practices Through Reflexive Domestic Disclosure
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social responsibility presumes that one can identify corporations
that are not engaging in socially responsible practices. If that is
so, consumers who spend their own money in ways that are
contrary to relevant moral principles are engaging in socially
irresponsible private behavior.
2.

Use of Property as a Business Owner or Investor

With money that has not been spent, one may start one’s
own business or invest in someone else’s.260 One purpose of
investing is to provide for one’s future needs or to provide for
future legitimate needs of others. One might also invest in order
to accumulate the funds necessary to start a socially responsible
business. Investing simply to accumulate wealth for oneself or
one’s heirs and devisees would not be consistent with Catholic
social doctrine, wherever the money were invested. In addition,
an inordinate desire for financial security can lead one to
withhold resources that might be used to alleviate real
suffering.261
Catholic social teaching and the universal
destination of goods suggest that rates of return should be only
one investment consideration among many.262 For one thing, a
rate of return may entail a level of risk that is incompatible with
legitimate reasons for investing.263
More importantly, an
investor is, in a sense, the owner of a business,264 and if she is

Regulation, 43 OSGOODE HALL L.J. 353, 353 (2005); John Parkinson, Disclosure and
Corporate Social and Environmental Performance: Competitiveness and Enterprise
in a Broader Social Frame, 3 J. CORP. L. STUD. 3, 3, 5 (2003); Donald C. Langevoort,
Commentary: Stakeholder Values, Disclosure and Materiality, 48 CATH. U. L. REV.
93, 95–96 (1998).
260
This discussion assumes investments in corporate debt or equity, but other
financial investments, including bank savings accounts and certificates of deposits,
and even government securities, ultimately finance someone’s business.
261
See GRISEZ, supra note 230, at 494–95; see also EVANGELII GAUDIUM, supra
note 131, ¶ 80.
262
UNITED STATES CONFERENCE OF CATHOLIC BISHOPS, ECONOMIC JUSTICE
FOR ALL ¶ 195 (1986), reprinted in CATHOLIC SOCIAL THOUGHT, supra note 127, at
572, 660–61.
263
See GRISEZ, supra note 230, at 504.
264
I am not suggesting that investors own the businesses in which they invest
in any legal sense; I mean only that they own their investment “business.” Also,
from the perspective of the individual, an investment is a use of her property to
participate in the economic benefits of a business, and thus makes her a participant
in the business through her ownership of property. Many investors also participate
as employees in the companies in which they invest. See Changes in U.S. Family
Finances from 2007 to 2010: Evidence from the Survey of Consumer Finances, 98
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conducting that business with caritas, she will consider many
other things besides her return on investment.
Among other things, the Church teaches that the owner of a
business265 must try to provide meaningful employment, pay a
just wage, provide a work environment and benefits package that
support the worker’s health and safety, provide an opportunity
for her employees to participate in decision making in the
business, provide adequate time for her employees to worship
and spend with family, and otherwise promote the authentic
development of her employees and possibly others by, perhaps,
encouraging education or, for those so inclined, spiritual
formation.266 She must, at a minimum, treat each of her
employees and everyone else with respect, and, ideally, view each
employee with caritas.
The socially responsible business owner must charge a fair
price for her goods or services and ensure that those goods and
services are of high quality and are themselves things that
promote authentic human development. Consider the response
of Professor Grisez when asked by the owner of an “upscale
restaurant” whether he could consider an applicant’s appearance
when hiring wait staff:
You describe your restaurant as an expensive one patronized by
the affluent, who, very likely, spend a good deal there on
luxurious foods and fine wines. In operating your business, you
must promote and thereby intend that sort of consumption.
Can you honestly judge that all of it, or at least enough of it to
make your business profitable, is morally justifiable? If not, you
intend what is unjustifiable, and you need to repent and change
the character of your business so that it will provide a truly
needed, and so legitimate, service.267

If one is suffused with caritas, all aspects of one’s business are
considered from the perspective of human development. What
message does one’s advertising send?268 From whom does one
purchase one’s supplies? Does one’s supplier pay a just wage and
FED. RES. BULL., June 2012, at 34 (reporting that 35.5% of households owning stock
hold the stock of an employer).
265
Business owners are a particular focus of the Church’s social doctrine. See
COMPENDIUM, supra note 126, ¶¶ 344, 345.
266
Id. ¶ 301.
267
GRISEZ, supra note 230, at 494–95.
268
See generally ALFORD & NAUGHTON, supra note 249, at 178–92; Spoerl, supra
note 30, at 284–85.
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respect the rights of his employees? Are one’s own and one’s
suppliers’ business operations environmentally sustainable?
Social responsibility requires that a business owner seek all
these things.
An investor provides funds so that someone else can operate
a business. An investor, like a business owner, must invest with
caritas.269 Ideally, she would invest in businesses owned by other
individuals with caritas, but those opportunities are likely to be
scarce. In the absence of that option, the faithful investor should
seek to invest in businesses whose practices are consistent with
Catholic social doctrine. A socially responsible investor does not
have the option to use her property to promote injustice or
oppression, and she should avoid cooperation with such acts if
possible.270 This is true not because the investor is morally
responsible for the acts of the managers of the business, but
because she is morally responsible for her own choices in using
her assets. An employee may be able to do her job even if she
knows that the enterprise in which she works will commit a
wrongful act, as long as she does not intend that act.271 A
shareholder, on the other hand, who invests in order to share the
profits of a business, necessarily intends the acts of the business
that are taken to increase profits, and is therefore formally
cooperating with any wrongful acts of the business.272 Investors
who are concerned with social justice cannot invest in businesses
that adhere to the shareholder wealth maximization norm.
The investor might also choose to use her investments to
encourage the businesses in which she invests to improve their
policies. The investment policy of the U.S. Conference of Catholic
Bishops (“U.S.C.C.B.”) includes “active corporate participation” to
“support policies in accord with its values and oppose those in

269
See CARITAS IN VERITATE, supra note 129, ¶ 65; CENTESIMUS ANNUS, supra
note 128, ¶ 36; UNITED STATES CONFERENCE OF CATHOLIC BISHOPS, ECONOMIC
JUSTICE FOR ALL, supra note 262, ¶ 354.
270
See Beyer, supra note 253, at 142–43 (discussing cooperation and toleration
of evil in connection with investment decisions).
271
See supra notes 238–242 and accompanying text.
272
See GRISEZ, supra note 230, at 504–05. Investment in a mutual fund is more
likely to involve material, rather than formal, cooperation because the investor
likely intends that the portfolio produce a reasonable rate of return without
intending the particular activities of the companies in the portfolio. See id. at 505–
06. Such material cooperation may be wrong also, depending on the circumstances.
See id. at 506.
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conflict with them.”273 The same goes for any investor, although
an individual will have fewer opportunities to engage
management in seeking corporate change. Moreover, there are
limits, under current law, to what shareholders are permitted to
do.274 The kinds of policies that a socially responsible investor is
likely to want to change will usually be within the discretion and
control of the board.275
Abandoning sweatshops, adopting
sustainable agricultural practices, and “promot[ing] generous
wage and benefit policies and adequate worker safety
guidelines”276 are all decisions within the business judgment of
the board and are not subject to shareholder control. If the
investor cannot convince the board to adopt policies consistent
with Catholic social teaching, the investor should invest
elsewhere.277
In recent years, more options for “socially responsible
investment” have become available, but the Church warns that
not all “social choice” funds are designed to encourage authentic
human development.278 Some Catholic institutions, including the
U.S.C.C.B., have developed investment policies that are
expressly designed to comport with Catholic social doctrine;279 the
complexity of their investment guidelines illustrates the
difficulty of their task.280 Disclosure of CSR policies can help

273
UNITED STATES CONFERENCE OF CATHOLIC BISHOPS, SOCIALLY
RESPONSIBLE INVESTMENT GUIDELINES ¶ 3.2 (2003) [hereinafter INVESTMENT
GUIDELINES]. The U.S.C.C.B. also notes that “mixed investments” in firms that do
both good and bad may be “tolerated” as long as the U.S.C.C.B. engages in
shareholder advocacy “with a reasonable hope of success for corporate change.” Id.
274
See Jay B. Kesten, Towards a Moral Agency Theory of the Shareholder Bylaw
Power, 85 TEMPLE L. REV. 485, 490 (2013); Colombo, Ownership, Limited, supra note
64, at 278–80.
275
Colombo, Ownership, Limited, supra note 64, at 278–79.
276
INVESTMENT GUIDELINES, supra note 273, ¶ 4.1.
277
See Beyer, supra note 253, at 143–44.
278
See CARITAS IN VERITATE, supra note 129, ¶ 45; see also GRISEZ, supra note
230, at 506; Mary Ellen Foley McGuire, Catholic Social Teaching Meets Wall Street:
Do Good While Doing Well, AMERICA MAG. (Nov. 19, 2007), https://www.a
mericamagazine.org/issue/634/article/catholic-social-teaching-meets-wall-street.
279
See Beyer, supra note 253, at 141.
280
But see Robert Milburn, Impact Investing Done Right, BARRON’S (Nov. 28,
2015),
http://www.barrons.com/articles/impact-investing-done-right-1448684226.
Milburn notes, however, that even professional investors sometimes find themselves
investing in businesses that do not share their social goals. Id.
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guide socially responsible investors.281 Such information is
increasingly available: A recent review found that ninety-four of
the Fortune 100 companies have CSR links on their websites,282
and CEOs are sometimes explicit about their rejection of the
shareholder wealth maximization norm.283
A high-profile
example occurred at a 2014 Apple shareholders’ meeting. When
a “conservative think tank and investor” called for Apple to stop
putting money in unprofitable green energy projects, Tim Cook
replied, “If you want me to do things only for ROI [return on
investment] reasons, you should get out of this stock.”284
It is unclear whether socially responsible investing actually
has any effect on the behavior of businesses,285 but that is not
really the point. The point is that the investor who cares about
social justice must avoid participation in harmful activities.
Commentators who argue that there is a moral duty to protect
the common good must address their rhetoric to those who are
able to act morally. Moral outcomes can only be achieved by
moral actors.
Moreover, if every Catholic dollar286 were
withdrawn from socially irresponsible investments and
redirected to businesses affirmatively engaged in socially
beneficial activities, there would undoubtedly be a positive
impact to those businesses,287 even if the irresponsible businesses
were not induced to change their behavior. And to the extent
managers and commentators continue to espouse the shareholder
wealth maximization norm, evidence that actual investors do not

281
See Gabrielle Palmer, Note, Stockholder Inspection Rights and an
“Incredible” Basis: Seeking Disclosure Related to Corporate Social Responsibility, 92
DENV. U. L. REV. ONLINE 125, 134–35 (2015).
282
The exceptions were: Berkshire Hathaway; Costco; Energy Transfer Equity;
Enterprise Products Partners, an energy company; World Fuel Services; and INTL
FCStone, an investment company.
283
See GUNTHER, supra note 24, at 177 (quoting CFO of Herman Miller
defending treatment of laid-off employees: “We think it’s the right thing to do. If you
don’t like that, you can go invest somewhere else.”).
284
Loulla-Mae Eleftheriou-Smith, Apple’s Tim Cook: Business Isn’t Just About
(Mar.
2,
2014,
5:41
PM),
Making
Profit,
INDEPENDENT
http://www.independent.co.uk/life-style/gadgets-and-tech/news/apples-tim-cookbusiness-isn-t-just-about-making-a-profit-9163931.html.
285
See Christopher M. Bruner, The Enduring Ambivalence of Corporate Law, 59
ALA. L. REV. 1385, 1435–39 (2008) (arguing that socially responsible investing is not
effective at changing corporate practices).
286
See Milburn, supra note 280 (noting that by some estimates $6.57 trillion is
engaged in “impact investing”).
287
See id.
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invest that way might cause them to reconsider their views.
Most importantly, investor social responsibility involves
individuals in decisions about the appropriate use of their own
property, not someone else’s.
CONCLUDING REFLECTIONS
At the end of the day, social responsibility assumes a moral
obligation to act in the best interests of the community. It is not
consistent with law or morality to encourage agents to use their
principal’s assets to advance goals their principals do not share.
It is consistent with both law and morality, however, to
encourage principals—owners of their own property—to use their
own assets to advance their own moral goals. In fact, the social
teaching of the Catholic Church requires it.
Encouraging
disloyalty is unlikely to lead to better behavior by anyone in the
long term, while enhancing individual moral responsibility may
reduce the incidence of business wrongdoing—which is, of
necessity, always carried out by individuals.
More
fundamentally, there is a certain dissonance in calls for
“corporate” responsibility, an oxymoron, that do not include calls
for individual responsibility. Every decision that an individual
makes, whether at work, at the mall, or at the stockbroker’s, is a
moral act. Sacrificing profits in the public interest begins at
home.

